Global society has been engaged to nail down on the hitherto unresolved North Korean nuclear issue. Due to shallow understanding of the North’s current status and core interest as well as the Pyongyang’s ambivalent attitude, most policies had short lived and the day of denuclearization seems still far-off. The goal of this article is to provide a framework to use in analyzing North Korea’s nuclear posture based on the alternative nuclear optimization theory. In this research, I emphasize the importance of geopolitical factors in determining a state’s nuclear posture and diplomacy. To draw conclusion, firstly, throughout theoretical debate and empirical evidences, how North Korea’s nuclear and missile capabilities have changed will be addressed based on the fact that the North will endeavor to be recognized as a de facto nuclear weapons state is leaving no stone unturned. For the research purpose, I adopted the ‘nuclear optimization theory’ coined by Vipin Narang, and review many aspect of other researcher’s conclusion. Finally, I will analyize Pyongyang’s nuclear posture with alternative optimization theory which donsider geopolitical aspects in the process. I argue that North Korea’s nuclear posture has been evolving toward more aggressive ones. Especially, due to Pyongyang’s geopolitical situation, the North will take Assured Retaliation posture toward the U.S., while posing more aggressive Asymmetric Escalation posture toward South Korea. This suggests, being isolated from the global society, North Korea will behave more aggressively in its foreign policy with their hostile nuclear posture. Considering the fact that North Korea’s nuclear postures has evolved toward more aggressive strategies over decades, the North will pressure U.S. and its allies to accomplish its goal of becoming nuclear state and will take more aggressive foreign policies and provocations.