U.S.-China relations will continue to be characterized chiefly by competition and confrontation in 2022, and the further decoupling of the United States and China across all domains. The growing contest between Washington and its closest partners and Beijing to shape the international order-from writing the rules and norms for the digital age to defining universal values and human rights, will pose increasing challenges for states seeking to preserve equidistant ties with both sides. While leaders in Washington and Beijing have stressed the need to compete without veering into outright conflict, whether and to what extent the two sides will be able to erect “guardrails” for responsible competition remains an open question, considering the extent of their conflicting national interests and the domestic political climate in both countries. The Biden administration’s strategy for managing the challenges posed by China has been largely structured on two broad efforts to date: (1) strengthening U.S. alliances and rallying allies and partners to better compete with China, and (2) establishing a multi-faceted relationship with China that includes elements of competition, confrontation, and cooperation on common interests. Although the administration has found substantial success on the first pillar of strengthening alliances and boosting coalitional efforts to collectively manage the challenges posed by China, there has been little progress on establishing a working framework for U.S.-China relations. While U.S.-China competition spans across all domains, three immediate to long-term security challenges to watch closely in the coming years include: instability in the Taiwan Strait, China’s rapid nuclear modernization and expansion, and the potential rise of rival Chinese-led alliance system. North Korea presents another acute challenge to the region. While denuclearizing North Korea will require coordinated efforts among all major stakeholders, and especially the ROK, United States and China, cooperation between Washington and Beijing on the Korean Peninsula remains a distant proposition given the sheer number of other pressing challenges weighing the U.S.-China bilateral relationship, in addition to Pyongyang’s inward turn and its apparent lack of interest in returning the negotiating table thus far. ROK-Japan relations remain significantly strained due to disputes over legal accountability and reparations for forced wartime laborers and sexual slavery during Japan’s colonial rule over Korea. Hopes for a full and immediate reset of relations with new leadership in Tokyo and in Seoul this spring may be overly ambitious given the domestic political risks for leaders on both sides. The risks may be seen as outweighing any potential benefits of revitalized relations given Seoul and Tokyo’s existing ability to work bilaterally with the United States and to respectively plug into other multilateral regional groupings. The lack of inter-alliance cooperation and bilateral cooperation between Seoul and Tokyo is a missed opportunity, however, given the magnitude of the common challenges facing the three states in the region. Seoul, in particular, risks falling behind as the center of gravity for regional multilateral cooperation among U.S. allies and partners moves to the Quad. A joint statement by the two leaders of South Korea and Japan expressing a commitment to use diplomacy rather than unrelated economic and security levers to address historical grievances, and to empower working-level officials to resolve differences and advance pragmatic and future-oriented cooperation across the security, economic and diplomatic sectors could serve as a promising start for steadily improving the bilateral relationship. The United States should also continue to encourage the improvement of bilateral ties between its two allies and to provide impetus for trilateral cooperation. In conclusion, the U.S.-ROK alliance faces significant challenges in the region. Close coordination and cooperation between the two allies, and with like-minded partners like Japan, will be critical for managing the diverse tasks that lie in the decades ahead. The United States should continue to deepen engagement with allies based on a positive agenda for the Indo-Pacific and should look to especially expand the economic component of its regional strategy to remain a relevant and competitive partner of choice. Washington should also work to establish a broad framework and practical mechanisms for responsible competition with China. South Korea can play a critical role in the region by contributing to multilateral initiatives and regional needs based on its values and interests. Seoul should continue to use its unique position to rally stakeholders to advance peace on the Korean Peninsula based on realistic, yet forward-looking assessments, and in close coordination first with the United States, and with like-minded partners.