Most attention focuses on the “supply-side” problem of nuclear proliferation intelligence — that is, the challenge of providing policymakers with timely and accurate information about the activities of states seeking nuclear weapons-making capability. Scant attention has focused on the “demand-side” problem, where policymakers sometimes prefer not to receive information about foreign proliferation activities, lest they be forced to respond in ways that would complicate their preferred policy agenda. This essay examines key instances of the non-use or abuse of proliferation intelligence on North Korea’s and Iran’s nuclear programs, when U.S. policymakers appeared to overrate their preferred policy response to North Korean and Iranian nuclear misbehavior, but also to be disinclined to further pursue intelligence that these proliferation cases had worsened,sometimes even suppressing the sharing of intelligence. Only when proliferation problems metastasized and became less manageable did the risks of subordinating nuclear nonproliferation policy come to be more fully appreciated.