Crisis Management Behavior of the United States towards North Korea
This study seeks to examine United States' crisis management behavior in response to North Korea’s 1st and 2nd nuclear tests. For this purpose, this dissertation identify and analyze America’s behavior towards North Korea through a main crisis management theory that deals with crisis control and assumes a coercive bargaining requirement.
Methods to perform research were based on Alexander L. George’s “Structured, Focused Comparison” approach. And although focused on crisis control and coercive bargaining as presented by Phil Williams as a key theory of crisis management, this study collectively applied requirements that can explain the responsiveness of the United States by screening and collecting among George’s political and operational requirements in the in the controlled aspect of a crisis, and coercive diplomacy requirements presented by key scholars in coercive bargaining aspects.
The United States’ response to the nuclear experiment crisis as a North Korean crisis were seen as straddling the line between hard-line policy and appeasement policy. Some scholars have a strong tendency to regard this kind of responsive behavior of United States as an “inconsistent” policy failure.
However, an integrated analysis of key crisis management theory shows that although United States’ crisis management behavior during the 1st and 2nd North Korean nuclear crises looks to reek of confusion on the surface, it was found that the driving force of behavior were clear principles (limitation of objectives and means in crisis) and consistent requirements (political and operational requirements).
Despite differences and similarities between crisis control and coercive bargaining, principle of denuclearization of North Korea through regime change implemented by Bush and Obama administration meets its political requirement for it can be deemed as limitation of objective under crises of nuclear tests.
Regarding limitation of means, conversation has been a relatively limited tool compared to substantial pressures imposed by the United States towards North Korea, indicating the need for combined utilization of multiple means such as implementing various channels of conversation, proposing requirements for resolving crisis and executing both political and diplomatic sanctions along with limited military oppressions.
In terms of operational requirement, military measure coordinated with political and diplomatic action of the United States, along with diplomatic and military options synchronized with the will of negotiation, need to be understood in relation with coercive diplomacy through limited military demonstration, preventing escalation of crisis through proportionate military oppression against provocation and nonproliferation which is a critical national benefit, rather than direct military against North Korea.
Moreover, making an effort of providing the hostile nation a path of retreat vector which comes compatible with its fundamental interests, can be effective if North Korean regime shows its changing attitude to realize denuclearization into action, with which the mentioned endeavor could enable the United States to deliver economic benefits and show the willing of coming to a dialogue.
Regarding coercive bargaining, the United States is more likely to select a stick than a carrot in case there occurs a strong conflict between its disapproval of nuclear armament and the drive towards nuclear armament by North Korea. This means that unless North Korea shows veracity in their will of denuclearization, the leverage of incentive by the United States should stay relatively low due to the asymmetry of motivation.
Though the United States is in absolute superiority in terms of delivering tension to force submission, obtaining pressure point, credibility in intimidation of punishment and predominance in escalation of war, its capability and influence was conducted with adjustment according to the level of crisis which was forced by the structural restriction of security environment in Korean peninsula.
By alternating between tough measures as crisis control and appeasement policy as coercive bargaining by the two different United States government parties at different times, it is understood that control and the coercion are naturally connected according to the large framework of national strategy of North Korean crisis goal, which is beyond the interests of partisanship (Republican/Democrat).
It impossible to declare United States’ response to the North Korean crisis as a failure because North Korea’s nuclear issue fundamentally is not characteristic that can be solved in a short-term from a North Korea-America relation, and United States will never recognize North Korea as a country with nuclear power status, one that North Korea wishes to ultimately achieve through nuclear experiments.
In terms of crisis management, in order for North Korea to abandon its nuclear activities, the situation will have to become a serious threat to the survival of the regime or unbearably painful to retain nuclear activities. Furthermore, if a situation in which North Korea must abandon its nuclear activities is realized, a development of situation in which North Korea must accept a cascade of core values such as human rights, reformation and opening up, market economy that the United States requires of rogue state. In this context, it is an issue in which it is difficult to basically separate America’s North Korean nuclear issue resolution from North Korea’s regime transformation.
In viewpoint of decision-making in crisis, during crisis management towards North Korea within the US-ROK alliance system, the United States recognizes the security of it's ally states as to be directly connected to America's own security and does it's best as a committed patron state to ensure to safety of South Korea. In such context, presence of conflicts between ROK-US do not act as a decisive factor as to relaxes or disrupt the alliance system due to solid institutional mechanisms.
So even in the next period of government policy, United States is bound to policies that involve crisis control and coercive bargaining and alternate between tough and moderate policies to effectively manage the crisis, and it is expected that a tough policy is needed for the long run. And as long as understanding and empathy in US-ROK relation continues due to the threat of North Korea and other various phenomenons, the alliance is prospected to develop a comprehensive cooperation relationship beyond the military cooperation against North Korea to perform defensive functions within the ROK-US alliance system.
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