The present study explores the strategies for, and limitations of, persuasion in messages concerning the peace process and denuclearization sent by Jae-In Moon, the President of the Republic of Korea, to North Korea. After analyzing the linguistic and discoursal strategies he used to achieve his goals in terms of the three aspects of ‘field’,‘mode’ and ‘tenor’ (Halliday & Hasan 1985), this article examines possible reasons for the partial successes achieved during the course of some peace process and the ultimate failure of attempts to realize North Korean denuclearization. Detailed analysis of nineteen speeches and remarks made by the President reveals that at least six macro-acts (including ‘presenting visions’ and ‘guaranteeing North Korea’s security’), seven cognitive and pragmatic strategies (such as ‘recontextualization’, ‘topos’ and ‘rhetoric of temporality’) and three interpersonal strategies (‘effective stance’, ‘politeness’ and ‘emphasizing ethnic identity’) can be identified respectively in each of the three aspects. The first half of the discussion reexamines these linguistic and discoursal strategies using Aristotle’s theory of rhetoric and suggests how the four elements of ‘logos’, ‘ethos’, ‘pathos’, and ‘timing’ might have contributed to the brevity of ‘honeymoon’ period between the two Koreas. The second half of the discussion applies Mitchell (2000)’s theory of analysis of conflicts and suggests that his notion of ‘respondibility’, among others, explains the ultimate failure of the peace process as a whole. This article concludes with two insights derived from an analysis of the nature of peace discourse and a social-psychological approach to persuasion.

1. 서론: 정치적 배경과 연구의 목적
2. 이론적 배경: ‘설득(하기)’의 개념과 주요 관심사
3. 분석 자료 및 방법
4. 설득을 위한 언어 및 담화 전략
5. 논의: 설득(하기)에서의 성공과 한계
6. 결론: 요약 및 분석의 함축
참고문헌