One of the most puzzling aspects of North Korea’s foreign policybehavior is its hyper-sensitive reactions to outside actors’ blasphemyagainst its supreme leader. At times, the DPRK is willing to sacrificeits economic gains and even security interests if the supremeleader’s esteem and honor are at stake. Why? We argue that it is because any blasphemy against the leader is tantamount to disrespectagainst the being of the nation and the North Korean peopleas a whole. This (an extreme form of “face saving”) can be attributedto the unique identity formation of leader and people in NorthKorean history and culture where identity is inseparably tied toself-esteem (how we regard ourselves) and esteem (how we areregarded by others). More specifically, our paper will cover fourmajor issues: first, the construction of a cultural theory of NorthKorea’s foreign policy behavior; second, the elucidation of identity,honor, and supreme esteem in the North Korean context throughthe analysis of its primary documents; third, an empirical examinationof deteriorating inter-Korea relations during the Lee Myungbakgovernment, rocket launching, and underground nuclear testingas a way of exploring its theoretical validity, and finally, the papergenerates several theoretical, empirical, and policy implications fora better understanding of North Korea’s foreign policy behavior.