Why did the George W. Bush Administration change its policy toward NorthKorea from confrontation to accommodation during the second nuclear crisis?This article answers the question by analyzing how and why a coalition—includingBush Administration doves, China, Russia, South Korea and, at times, Japan andNorth Korea—worked together to overcome the reticence of Bush Administrationhawks to engage with Pyongyang. Building on the soft balancing, bureaucraticpolitics, and transgovernmental coalitions literature, this article explains how theSix-Party Talks served this coalition to understand the extent to which theyshared goals and policies. Aware of the divisions within the Bush Administrationregarding policy toward North Korea, the five other parties to the talks were ableto undermine the preferred policies of U.S. hawks while supporting the policiesof doves. Thus, rather than determining Washington’s behavior, this coalition laid theground for U.S. officials supportive of accommodation to upload their preferencesinto official Bush Administration’s policy. This article therefore also sheds light onhow soft balancing can be used by third parties to influence the decision-makingprocess in the United States.