Since 1989 when the North Korean nuclear issue first rose to global prominence,efforts by the international community to resolve the issue have not moved itmeaningfully closer to the actual elimination of North Korea’s nuclear weaponsprogram and weapon holdings. While North Korea has succeeded in getting theUnited States to the negotiation table by using the nuclear card and consolidatingits own regime security, the process of resolving the issue has been locked in a cycleof negotiation, agreement, abrogation of agreements, the heightening of crisis,and renegotiation. Thus, whereas the Six-Party Talks have yielded agreements toend North Korea’s nuclear programs, notably through the September 19, 2005 JointStatement and the February 13 Agreement of 2007, North Korea has continued todevelop its nuclear weapons program. It is therefore clear that the North Koreannuclear issue is showing little, if any, sign of being resolved despite pressurefrom the international community, including the South Korean government’ssuspension of economic assistance and cooperation with the North, and the UNSecurity Council sanctions against the North. This paper accordingly examinesthe North Korean nuclear issue—the most pressing security problem on the KoreanPeninsula during the past two decades. This paper explores the recurring patternof the North Korean nuclear crises and North Korea’s negotiating behavior,analyzing the core and critical issues of dealing with the North Korean nuclearprogram and the difficulties that have arisen in the process. In so doing, policypriorities are identified that could help to bring about a nuclear weapons-freeKorean Peninsula.