The Korean Armistice Agreement of 1953 halted the fighting between United Nations, North Korean, and Chinese forces. Although no final peace settlement has been reached, deterrence has prevented the renewal of major combat operations on the Korean Peninsula. The general success of deterrence on the Korean Peninsula-despite Pyongyang’s frequent provocations–has led many analysts and scholars to expect that North Korea will be deterred from using its nuclear weapons, even if conventional war were to occur again. Unfortunately, that optimistic view is unwarranted; it misunderstands deterrence theory and misreads history. In fact, in a future conventional conflict with the United States and South Korea, North Korea will face strong incentives to use nuclear weapons. Like other weak states facing dire consequences during a conventional conflict North Korea would see nuclear escalation as a key option for stalemating its militarily superior foes. This paper explores the likely role of North Korea’s nuclear weapons in Pyongyang's military strategy during a conventional war on the Peninsula, and in particular how and why North Korea might employ its nuclear arsenal during a conflict. 1 argue that nuclear use during the next Korean war 15 far more likely than North Korean restraint