This article investigates the plan and strategic stance of three communist leaders, Kim Il Sung, Mao Zedong and Stalin on armistice during the Korean War. Three communist leaders hoped to successfully conclude the armistice agreement since the armistice talks started. However, The communist side conceded the main arguments of truce to the UN side, and it means that they wanted a ceasefire more badly. One of the main reason that armistice talks were prolonged was that the communists side misjudged the issue of POWs, focusing on the problem of the military demarcation line. There were differences in the views on the problem of the armistice among three communist leaders. Kim Il Sung, a leader of North Korea, wanted to be a quick termination of hostilities as he had losed hope for winning the war, being discouraged by the bombing of the U.S. Air Force and the increase of loss of human life and material damage in North Korea. But his desire could hardly be free from the interests of the countries concerned. In the early stages, Mao Zedong held more or less optimistic outlook about the prospects of the negotiations because he had made an incorrect appraisal over the intent of the United States. However, he changed his mind and made a decision to take a prolonged war on the mid-1952, when the United States suggested to release only a limited number of Chinese POWs. Stalin took a careful stance not to lose the communist cause in negotiations with the U.S. He had chosen to continue the war rather than accepting disadvantageous truce as POW's issue entered into dispute. In sum, the communists were not so entirely satisfied with the armistice because they failed to attain the withdrawal of foreign troops and 38 military demarcation claims on the strength of the UN side. In the matter of POWs, the UN side refused to accept communist side's claim on enforced repatriation of all POWs. As a result, a large number of North Korean POWs were left in South Korean territory as “anti-communists POWs”.