After experiencing a security crisis in the latter half of the 1960s, the Park Jeong-hi regime started to spread the so-called ‘State Security’ discourse throughout the country, which accompanied the existing ‘Country Development’ cause. The Park Jeong-hi regime’s slogan, which was ‘We build while we fight’, was created from this kind of environment. The State Security discourse defined North Korea as the foreign antagonist and an enemy, yet the ‘South Korea-North Korea’ relationship was not that simple. Extreme words were used against North Korea, yet North Korea was also what would eventually be united with the South, and after all, all the residents were part of the Korean race too. In order to escape from this dilemma, the Park Jeong-hi regime emphasized South Korea’s status as the legitimate successor of the Korean race, and also intended to actually elevate the possibility of a war between South and North Koreas. By raising the prospect of a probably inevitable war, the regime wanted to deal with the dual nature of North Korea, which was to be destroyed at the moment but was also to be embraced and possibly joined in the future. The basic structure of the ‘State Security’ discourse was based upon the internal entities’ continuing conflicts and strifes. All the conflicts would create new combinations of situations, and in such condition an extreme form of politics would sustain and support the State Security discourse. Yet sometimes, rather odd connections would be made out of those conflicts, and such odd connections would create ambiguous standoffs. For example, spies and ordinary citizens were not to be distinguishable by plain sight, and the subjects and objects had to be interchangeable in their positions, as a rather indiscernible edge between the subject and the object would produce constant fear among the public. And with no distinction made between a ‘colleague’ and an ‘enemy,’ all colleagues were to be treated as potential enemies, unless they were proven not to be. The State Security discourse was primarily designed to pursue internal unity by fending off external threats through a war model, yet the inside and the outside were connected to each other, literally as the two sides of a Mobius strip. With the industrialization of Korea in rapid progress, new conflicts and new types of animosity were to surface rather immediately, and the State Security discourse came to not only target the outside of the country but the inside as well. President Park Jeong-hi threatened the public by letting them know that any faction trying to subvert the government, even when that faction was anti-Communist in nature, could be punished and executed by the National Security Law. He was trying to overcome a crisis situation in the inside with the State Security discourse, yet in the process such discourse was not always in perfect sync with the government’s anti-Communist stance. The power in command was considering not only the Communists but also anti-government factions and the social malpractices in general, as potential enemies of the state. This was indeed a life-and-death type of politics. Park Jeong-hi placed a lot of emphasis on the concept of ‘death,’ while also doing some things for the issues of ‘life.’ It seems like he, with his own demise, tried to bring all others as well to something of a closure, and therefore laying down a ‘foundation for life.’ With regard to the issue of death, the Park Jeong-hi regime magnified the ‘crisis of war,’ and amplified the people’s ‘fear of extinction,’ yet it also put together a model composed of two causes: Development and Welfare, necessary for survival and the continuing of life.