While China’s new military capabilities are an issue of growing importance to regional security, it should be understood that they are very much a work in progress. It is also important to note that it is not China’s military modernization per se, but its ability to project and sustain power along and beyond its borders—in particular,the possibility to resolve forcefully its outstanding maritime disputes and various contingencies in the region. This article argues that China’s “anti-access capability”—a U.S.-coined term originally developed for a Taiwan crisis—is equally applicable to other major regional cases such as the Spratly disputes and a North Korean contingency. Furthermore,notwithstanding China’s continuous efforts to develop and deploy various types and classes of weapons/platforms, it is the Russian systems and technologies that are most capable and thus assigned to the highest mission-critical areas. In assessing China’s current and likely future military capabilities as well as their implications for the region, it is necessary to take note of the following:• It is very important not to “overestimate” or “underestimate” China’s actual military capability, as war is most likely when China overestimates and others underestimate the PLA’s capability. • China’s military not only employs mixed defense strategies but it also possesses both new and old (in fact, very old) military technologies. Its more than a dozen sources of foreign technologies are a nightmare for system integration and interoperability. • There exists asymmetry of military capability between China and its weaker neighbors. While the PLAN is weak in several important aspects, many of its neighbors’ navies are weaker still. • Some have argued that China’s foreign policy behavior apparently became more “assertive” in 2009–2012, but it is wiser to keep in mind that China has always been assertive and aggressive when it comes to what it defines as “sovereignty and territorial issues” as well as its newest “core interest.”• For Korean security it is imperative to take into account the geostrategic and historical factors. On top of the existing military threats from North Korea, the ROK should be able to employ a) a hedging strategy, b) “limited defense sufficiency”strategy, and c) rock-solid relations with the United States.