One of the most promising theoretical perspectives in the study of foreign policy is that it is heavily influenced by domestic politics. In this study, we will examine North Korea’s foreign policy with respect to its domestic political situation. In particular, we will attempt to uncover the influence that domestic politics has in North Korea’s foreign policy behavior, specifically in regard to weapons of mass destruction. Whether or not and to what extent domestic politics influence the nuclear issues are the primary questions that we will attempt to address in this paper. In answering these questions, we will analyze three of the most recent nuclear crises: the first nuclear crisis of 1993-1994, the missile crisis of 1998 and the second nuclear crisis of 2002-2003. The diversionary theory will be utilized as the primary theoretical framework to analyze the cases. Based on suggestions from the diversionary theory, we will test the hypothesis that North Korea conducts its foreign policy in a risky manner as a means to divert the people’s attention outward when the regime is (or perceives that it is) facing difficulties in domestic politics. For that purpose, we will examine the domestic political situation in North Korea during these periods and analyze the perceptions of the Pyongyang regime in such circumstances.