Throughout its history, North Korea's leadership had been trying to preserve its autonomy at any cost. The Juche ideology and the Suryung system promoted autonomy domestically and internationally. In the aftermath of the Cold War era, Kim Il Sung was confronted with two options: to avoid regional isolation by pursuing the cross-recognition of both Koreas by all the major powers or to create a new balance of power through nuclear armament. In response to the South Korean government's Nord Politik policy in 1988, Kim Il Sung during the early 1990s adopted the former of the two options, a "Sud Politik." Confronted with the sudden and unexpected recognition of South Korea by the Soviet Union in 1990, North Korea made efforts to normalize relations with Japan and the U.S. while enhancing Inter-Korean relations (through the North-South Basic Agreement on Reconciliation, Non-Aggression and Exchanges and Cooperation). However, the Süd Politik failed as a conservative US, Japan, South Korea coalition shifted its North Korea policy from engagement to coercion in the aftermath of the recognition of South Korea by China in August 1992. In response to this new coercive environment North Korea shifted its Süd Politik to its second option: nuclear armament. In order to accomplish this process the North Korean leadership fully utilized their diplomatic and domestic autonomy. No forces domestic or international would be allowed to block the nuclear armament process. The domestic and international autonomy that were established with the Juche ideology and Suryung system were further re-enforced with a new government-military coalition. The result was a 20 year-long nuclear crisis in which North Korea fell into the trap of autonomy; it successfully preserved its autonomy but at the cost of a collapsed political and economic system.