Examined in this article is the May 16th Military Regime's general policy of dealing with the United Nations. The U.N. was quite important and influential in defining the international society's position toward the Korean peninsula and all the related issues. So, the nature and meaning of the Military regime's policy dealing with that U.N. should be analyzed as well, with the following three questions kept in mind. First, whether or not the regime's attitude in its dealing with the U.N. was adequate, considering the international situations back then? At the time, the Korean peninsula was slowly becoming a rather 'non-issue,' and on the international stage the idea of 'two Koreas' was becoming increasingly 'natural and expected,' as we can see from many discussions overseas to invite to an international occasion either South or North Korea (or sometimes both), or the well publicized negotiations for global sport events to organize a single team of representatives composed of both South and North Korean athletes. At the time, the Allied states and the Military regime shared the principle of resolving the Korean matter through U.N., yet they were also ready to pursue some other new avenues within the boundaries of that principle, while inside the regime there were many colliding opinions regarding options such as either requesting an automatic introduction of the Korean matter to the floor of the U.N. General Assembly, or urging U.N. to only invite South Korean representative and not the North one, or even refusing to appear at the General Assembly as long as a North Korean representative was present. The Military regime's demand at the 17th General Assembly, which requested changing of the title of the agenda and the UNCURK's visit to North Korea, was so far from the international temperature and was not a viable option. Although the regime itself tried some changes earlier at the 16th Assembly, it was only a slight modification, a rather passive and insignificant change, of its original stance. The regime essentially returned to the past ways of dealing with the U.N., only trying to obtain a strategically sound ground in its standoff with North Korea,just like former regimes did. Second, whether or not the regime's policy of dealing with U.N. was compatible with Korea's interest as a country in general? It was surely consistent with the regime's unification policy and diplomatic policies, yet whether or not it was consistent with the interest of the country is a completely different matter. There were no significant contents change except mere diplomatic maneuvers in the policy, and as a result the Korean peninsula continued to be pushed away and shoved aside from the actual discussion table of U.N. meetings. As people eventually began to lose interest in the Korean matter, South Korea's position and status inside U.N. was also ultimately weakened and degraded. Third, was there any other options, other than the ones which had been chosen by the regime? At the 23rd assembly the Park Jeong-hi regime shifted its position to have the Korean matter introduced to the General Assembly 'at its discretion,' and at the 28th assembly it accepted and agreed to sit with the North Korean representative at the same floor. Yet such modifications were only a rehash of plans already suggested by the regime itself at the 16th assembly, as well as a copy of the allied states' plan as well. In short, the Military regime's position toward U.N. was not at all appropriate considering the international situations of the time, and was not compatible with the general interest of the Korean people either. Also, even though the regime had other options as well, they chose to maintain their original policy, and that became a burden for following administrations.