The issue of Koreans resident in Japan in the latter half of the 1950s was handled under an out of ordinary practice of sending them to North Korea, rather than being discussed within the framework of the Korea-Japan Conference (1951-1964). An observation of how the issue was raised during the bilateral talks and the actual execution of the repatriation plan provides a window into the logic behind the Korean and Japanese government positions as they participate in the bilateral talks as well as a general view of the intervention means and position of the US government during the process. Under the influence of economic interests and the logic of the Cold War, normalization of the Korean-Japan bilateral relations took place in a way that relinquished any attempt to resolve the thorny issues of the past between the two countries. However, it is interesting to note that the approach taken by US and Japan vis-à-vis the issue of “repatriation” to North Korea created a certain paradox to the Cold War logic of reinforcing blockade against the USSR. Indeed, the repatriation manifested that there exists room for compromise with the Communists within the context of diplomatic pragmatism and that a strong logic of economic interest was at play in the conclusion of the consequential bilateral treaty. All in all, the historic nature and genuine identity of the Koreans living in Japan at the time were largely ignored in the process of sending them to North Korea. Indeed, diplomatic pragmatism was at play in the course of the "repatriation" and the matter was masked as an issue of human rights, under the circumstances of acutely contradicting interests among Korean, US and Japanese governments. It is in this respect that no party among the three governments of Korea, US and Japan can claim immunity to their accountability in the issues of the Korean residents in Japan.