This paper is empirical research that looks into the composition of the U.S. military’s intelligence gathering activities and risk assessment efforts through a case study of 1968’s Pueblo incident. This research utilizes a wide range of comprehensive raw materials and presents the following lessons. First, the U.S. military insisted the mission be carried out despite analysis from U.S. intelligence agencies and repeated warnings from North Korea. Second, due to contradictions in the structure of the U.S. military’s operational management system, final risk assessment work on operational responsibility was carried out carelessly. Third, by not properly preparing the U.S. military’s emergency response system, the U.S. could not prevent North Korea from capturing the Pueblo. These conclusions suggest lessons that can be applied to the sinking of the South Korean corvette — Cheonan — in the west sea off the coast of the Korean Peninsula in March 2010.
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