The nuclear weapons tests conducted by North Korea in October 2006 and May 2009 demonstrated the failure of attempts by the international community led by the United States to deter such development. The situation has now become a problem of compelling the North to give up its weapons program. Drawing from the literature on deterrence failures and coercive diplomacy, and from past case studies, this paper reexamines the nature and progression of the issue. It argues that the U.S. lacked a clear vision of its objectives and failed to create a sense of urgency in North Korea to decide on and implement the abolition of its nuclear program; and at the same time, the means of punishment used by the U.S. were limited due to the Iraq War, North Korea’s military capability, and the lack of coordination among the multiple coercers. This paper proposes that while the U.S. and its allies prepare a multi-faceted set of threats and incentives to persuade the North that the costs of the weapons program outweigh its benefits, further provocations would necessitate a decisive application of coercive diplomacy.