This essay argues that China’s acquisition of Russian weapons and technologies has been the most important source for the PLA’s development of “indigenous” weapons as well as for its force modernization. This is evident in the new pattern of force modernization observable since 2000 and is likely to continue at least until 2020. This new pattern is attributable to: 1) a continued defense budget increase for 22 years in a row (1989∼2010); 2) a synergistic effect between the import of foreign weapons/technologies and domestic R&D on new weapons; 3) a strategic reassessment at the end of the 1990s; and 4) a success in a series of defense-industrial reform measures, which began in 1998∼99. Probably the most consequential aspect of PLA force modernization will be a change in the regional structure of power over which the U.S. maintains a leading role, especially when the PLA acquires a more extensive and sustained campaign-level war-fighting capability from the current theater-level force. The PLA Navy’s emphasis on “anti-access strategy” and the likely development of ASBM capability as well as its ongoing debate over the procurement of additional submarine force and/or a new aircraft carrier project all point to its twin goals of preparing for a Taiwan contingency and of building a truly regional navy. While China’s “military rise” is of an indirect and longer-term nature to ROK security, it is important to note the continued relevance of the Korean Peninsula and the West Sea (Yellow Sea) to China’s security. The PLA’s force modernization should be subject to a regular and objective review, and the ROK planners must also continue a wide array of diplomatic and military measures including a hedging strategy, alliance politics, “limited defense sufficiency,” and domestic consensus- building.