I apply a generic framework of states’ international goals to Chinese foreignpolicy toward North Korea and unification. Following traditional internationalrelations theory, I argue that states seek, in ranked order, security, economic gain,and prestige in their interaction with other states. Applied to China and NorthKorea, this suggests: 1. Security: North Korea ‘buffers’ China from the democraciesof South Korea, Japan, and the United States. As long as North Korea does not veertoo wildly from Chinese preferences, China will obstruct unification. If it cannot, itwill likely seek Korean neutralization and a withdrawal of US forces in exchange forits acquiescence. 2. Prosperity: China will likely seek to vouchsafe its unique economicpenetration of North Korea in a united Korea. However, South Korean economicinteraction with China is so great that whether China gains or loses economicallyfrom unification is indeterminate. 3. Prestige: China suffers growing international‘audience costs’ by indefinitely supporting the North. This is the likeliest point ofleverage for those seeking to disjoin Beijing from Pyongyang, accelerate unification,and win over hesitant Chinese elites. This paper assumes China to be a rationalactor; it therefore will continue to support North Korean sovereignty until the costsof #3 outweigh the gains of #1, with #2 indeterminate. If US manages to ‘pivot’ toAsia, it may up-end the security calculus, by tying a growing US Asian presence to Chinese behavior on North Korea.