Beijing passively supports Kim Jong-il’s succession plan. This support has been structured into its DPRK policy centered on the principles of crisis aversion, even though it realizes the high costs of this policy: huge economic aid to an unpredictable neighbor and the negative regional response. This status quo-based policy symbolizes not only Beijing’s lingering “buffer zone” mentality but also its difficulty in finding any feasible substitute. Therefore, Beijing is not in a position to visibly alter its DPRK policy any time soon. Yet China may have revised the bottom line of its policy vis-à-vis the North in the wake of the 2010 adventurism that dragged China into confrontation against its will. This would be a hedging strategy, setting pre-determined plans to preempt any precarious situation on the peninsula and cooperating with regional countries regarding sudden developments in Pyongyang. At the same time it would hedge against the possibility of a war for regime change on the ground. Beijing’s general view of the prospects for the succession is relatively optimistic, since Kim Jong-il is making detailed plans for the transfer of power and he may still have a number of years to live, granting the extra time which is crucial for consolidating the heir’s power.