This article examines the Kim Young‐sam government’s policies in terms of the North Korea‐U.S. talks on the first North Korean nuclear crisis. This paper argues that the Kim government (1993‐1998) was unsuccessful in influencing U.S. policy because it tried to take advantage of outdated realist policy tools in the post‐Cold War era. The world order in the post‐Cold War era is different from that of the Cold War era. The ideological blocs have collapsed and the foreign policy of small states needs to be adjusted in this new world order. However, the Kim government stuck to its realist approach to international order and the attitude toward the U.S. The government adopted a containment policy toward North Korea and tried to alter U.S. policy by using realist policy tools, such as manipulation and taking a neutralist position, while dispensing with liberal policy tools, such as consultation norms and transnational coalitions. The Kim government’s limited impact on U.S. policy implies that the South Korean government had better make use of liberal policy tools to influence U.S. foreign policy in the post‐Cold War era.