This Purpose of the thesis is to analyze North Korea's nuclear threat level and suggest customized conventional nuclear integration(CNI) measures taking into account the threat level. As a theoretical discussion, independent and dependent variables were derived based on the threat balance theory and deterrence theory. As a framework for the analysis, North Korea's aggressive nuclear capabilities and aggressive intentions were used as independent variables, and extended deterrence, conventional deterrence(triaxial systems) according to threat level were used as dependent variables. Extended deterrence was subdivided into general extended deterrence, enhanced extended deterrence, conditional nuclear rental, tactical nuclear redeployment and NATO-style nuclear sharing by threat level. The three-axis system subdivided the order of increasing the response strength into KMPR, KAMD, Kill-Chain.
As for the deterrence measures by threat level, 9 deterrence measures were proposed by the 3×3 matrix. The criterion for evaluating the threat level is that nuclear capability is quantitatively evaluated based on the amount of reserves compared to the goal of possessing a nuclear warheads(300), and the intention is quantitatively evaluated based on whether the nuclear posture is aggressive or defensive. The threat level is evaluated comprehensively considering various other qualitative factors. CNI deterrence measures are divided into five stages, from the lowest stage, general extended deterrence/KMPR, to the highest stage, tactical nuclear relocation and NATO-style nuclear sharing/Kill Chain.
North Korea's nuclear capabilities are rapidly evolving. The annual plutonium production capacity is 6～7.4kg and the highly enriched uranium production capacity is 170.4～214kg. The target number of nuclear warheads is 300, and it is estimated that there are currently between 75 and 119. There are 36 types of nuclear capable missiles, some of which are under development. The miniaturization of nuclear weapons, ICBM re-entry and MIRV technology, and supersonic technology are almost complete, but further testing is required and the development of nuclear submarines is in the early stages. North Korea's nuclear intentions are evolving aggressively in connection with the evolution of its capabilities. The North Korean regime's political(strategic) and military intentions are mixed with aggressive and defensive intentions. The legalization of an aggressive unclear preemptive attack and nuclear operational training under Kim Jong-un's leadership to maintain readiness have vary aggressive intentions. On the other hand, Kim Jong-un's assertive command and control and the storage of nuclear warheads in central facilities without assembly have a defensive intention in terms of management and operation. Although the nuclear posture is declaratively asymmetric retaliation, it maintains a hybrid nuclear posture that combines strategically ambiguous assured retaliation and asymmetric retaliation posture.
Currently, North Korea's Nuclear threat level is 'medium', both in terms of capabilities and intentions considering quantitative analysis based on the number of nuclear warheads and nuclear posture and various qualitative factors. Accordingly, the CNI deterrence measures are reinforced extended deterrence in which nuclear strategic assets are constantly deployed on the Korean Peninsula and Kill Chain-Centered deterrence measures. Conventional suppression measure is being built around the Kill Chain when considering the budget allocation for building a three-axis system. However, the frequent deployment of U.S. nuclear strategic assets is insufficient, so it must be actively requested through NCG.
The following measures must be taken to advance the CNI on the Korean Peninsula. Nuclear information must be shared between South Korea and the United States, and education must be provided to foster professional manpower. Additionally, a pro-war operation plan that reflects nuclear deterrence and response operations must be established. Government-level TTS, military-level TTX, nuclear scenario-based combined exercises, and joint drills in the deployment of U.S. strategic assets should be conducted, and observations of nuclear drills in the U.S. are also required. In addition, considering the entanglement of conventional and nuclear power and the ROK-US combined defense system, the Korean Strategic Command should clarify support and cooperation with the CFC and the US strategic Command to minimize friction between the implementation of the CNI deterrence measures.
For tailored CNI deterrence for each level of North Korean nuclear threat, the threat level should be evaluated periodically and linked to policies by the South Korea-U.S. consultative body, such as SCM/EDSCG/NCG. Additionally, Seoul and Washington should also work closely with related actors to reduce North Korea's nuclear threat level. This is because North Korea's nuclear threat level can be mitigated in a variety of ways, including negotiations, restoring thrust between leaders, and reducing nuclear warheads. Finally, it is a matter to be supplemented and developed. Qualitative factors were considered when analyzing the nuclear threat level, but in order to objectify it more, it is necessary to evaluate each factor by weighting it. Second, several measures were proposed to advance the CNI deterrence measures, but the specific operational concept of the CNI suppression plan to be applied to the Korean Peninsula was not presented, but it must be developed in the future.

목차---i
표목차---iv
그림목차---vi
약어---vii
Ⅰ. 서 론 ---1
1. 연구배경 및 목적---1
2. 연구방법 및 범위 ---5
3. 선행연구 검토 ---6
Ⅱ. 이론적 논의---10
1. 위협균형론: 북한의 핵 위협수준 판단기준 ---10
1) 월트의 위협균형론과 위협수준 영향요소 ---10
2) 북핵 위협수준 판단을 위한 영향요소 재검토---13
2. 억제이론: 북핵 위협 억제를 위한 한국의 선택방안 ---16
1) 억제의 일반적 개념 및 유형--- 16
2) 북핵 위협 억제를 위한 한국적 선택지 검토 ---22
3. 분석의 틀 ---31
Ⅲ. 북한의 핵 능력--- 36
1. 핵 개발 기반체계 ---36
2. 핵 물질 생산능력 ---44
1) 플루토늄--- 45
2) 무기급 고농축우라늄 ---50
3. 북한 핵탄두--- 57
1) 핵실험과 무기화 수준 ---57
2) 핵탄두 보유량--- 69
4. 핵탄두 운반수단--- 77
1) 탄도미사일 프로그램 기원--- 77
2) 단거리/준중거리/중거리/장거리 미사일 ---84
3) 순항/해상기반 미사일--- 91
5. 소 결론--- 96
Ⅳ. 북한의 핵 의도 ---100
1. 정치(전략)적 의도---100
1) 김일성 시기(1948～1994) ---100
2) 김정일 시기(1994～2011) ---108
3) 김정은 시기(2011～현재) ---114
2. 군사적 의도 ---121
1) 핵 교리 ---121
2) 핵 지휘·통제 ---130
3) 핵 운용훈련--- 141
3. 북한의 핵전략 ---152
1) 핵 태세 ---152
2) 핵무기 운용방식---160
4. 소 결론 ---168
Ⅴ. 북한 핵 위협수준 및 한미 재래식·핵통합(CNI) 억제방안 ---171
1. 북한 핵 위협수준 ---171
2. 한미 북핵 재래식·핵통합(CNI) 억제방안--- 178
1) 미국의 핵 확장억제---178
2) 한국의 Kill Chain 중심 거부적 억제---199
3. 재래식·핵통합(CNI) 발전방안--- 204
1) CNI 인식 및 고려요소 ---204
2) 미국의 핵 운용개념--- 206
3) 한반도 CNI 발전방안--- 210
Ⅵ. 결 론 ---225
참고문헌 ---231
영문초록 ---250