While remaining committed to the goal of complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, the administrations of Joe Biden and Moon Jae-in regard denuclearization as a long-term process that should be pursued incrementally, focusing initially on negotiating practical, interim steps that can arrest the growth The terms “freeze” or “cap” are often used to describe the objective of initial or early steps to limit North Korea’s nuclear and missile capabilities. But those terms may be misleading. No package of measures remotely achievable could prevent all qualitative or quantitative improvements in DPRK capabilities. For example, even if a nation-wide ban on the production of fissile material could be negotiated and effectively implemented (discussed later in this paper), it would be exceedingly difficult to verifiably prevent North Korea from fabricating additional nuclear weapons from fissile material it had already produced. Moreover, those terms would not accurately describe initial measures that might reduce North Korean capabilities, such as reductions, even token reductions, in existing nuclear weapons or ballistic missiles. Therefore, this paper uses more general language, such as “arrest the growth,” to describe the objective of most first-stage deals that have been proposed. of North Korea’s nuclear and missile programs and reduce the threat they pose to their countries and the security of Northeast Asia. Proponents of the much more ambitious effort to maximize pressures against North Korea in order to compel it to give up its nuclear deterrent completely and rapidly criticize such a long-term, incremental approach. They believe it will fail to get Pyongyang to move beyond an initial phase and will result in abandonment of the goal of complete denuclearization. Presidents Biden and Moon are in agreement that the effort to pressure North Korea to accept rapid denuclearization would surely fail and leave the North free to continue improving and expanding its nuclear and missile capabilities. But the incremental approach they supported at their May 2021 summit meeting in Washington leaves open some critical questions. In particular, a long-term incremental approach can be pursued in two quite different ways, and it is not yet clear which path will be adopted. One way would be to negotiate a multiyear roadmap of sequential steps that would lead all the way to complete denuclearization in an agreed period of time. Initial limits on North Korea would be integral components of such a timebound roadmap. A second way would be to negotiate a succession of free-standing measures that would progress toward the agreed goal of complete denuclearization but without an agreed timetable for reaching that goal. Successive steps toward the goal would require additional negotiations and agreements. Supporters of the first way – a timebound roadmap – criticize the idea of pursuing a succession of free-standing deals. They use some of the same argumentation that proponents of rapid denuclearization use to criticize any long-term, incremental approach: that the process will not proceed beyond the first phase and will result in eventual acceptance of North Korea as a permanent nuclear-armed state. Supporters of the second way – a succession of discrete measures – criticize the idea of a timebound roadmap, arguing that efforts to negotiate it would most likely fail and would forfeit the opportunity to place near-term constraints on DPRK programs. They also argue that, in the unlikely event of North Korea agreeing to such a roadmap, there would be a high probability of it pulling out of the deal at a future time of its choosing. This paper reviews the Trump administration’s efforts to achieve North Korean denuclearization, describes what appears to be the North Korea policy of the Biden administration, and analyzes what may emerge as a significant debate about which, if any, incremental approach to denuclearization is most likely to succeed. The terms “freeze” or “cap” are often used to describe the objective of initial or early steps to limit North Korea’s nuclear and missile capabilities. But those terms may be misleading. No package of measures remotely achievable could prevent all qualitative or quantitative improvements in DPRK capabilities. For example, even if a nation-wide ban on the production of fissile material could be negotiated and effectively implemented (discussed later in this paper), it would be exceedingly difficult to verifiably prevent North Korea from fabricating additional nuclear weapons from fissile material it had already produced. Moreover, those terms would not accurately describe initial measures that might reduce North Korean capabilities, such as reductions, even token reductions, in existing nuclear weapons or ballistic missiles. Therefore, this paper uses more general language, such as “arrest the growth,” to describe the objective of most first-stage deals that have been proposed.