Economic sanctions against North Korea face several limitations to dissuade the nation from further development of its nuclear program in terms of the political sector, the economic sector, and the sanctions themselves. First, North Korea’s leaders have removed any interest groups and public opposition, who could turn economic hardship into political pressure, with a one-party system based on the Juche ideology. Second, more than 90 percent of North Korea’s trade is with its political patron, China, which considers North Korea a strategic buffer zone against the US–South Korea alliance. Thirdly, the existence of longstanding and comprehensive sanctions has compelled North Korea to develop its ability to persist despite a scarcity of goods and chronic economic difficulties. To make economic sanctions more effective, first, economic sanctions should not hinder the move toward marketization in North Korea, considering that marketization would not only raise citizens’ voices to protect their private property, but also manipulate “pro-marketization corruption” among mid-level public officials. Additionally, China’s national interests and public opinions could become overriding leverages for China to shift its North Korea policy. Finally, considering that one of the critical weakness of dictatorships is that the regime unavoidably becomes inflexible, economic sanctions should generate continuous, shifting stress levels to the regime.