The Biden administration sees integrated deterrence within the broad context of China as the long term “pacing threat” and Russia as an immediate, acute threat. However, there is also increasing recognition that specific security challenges, such as escalated tensions on the Taiwan Strait and the Korean Peninsula, are not isolated from great power geopolitical competition. This paper examines the degree to which nuclear deterrence on the Korean Peninsula is connected to integrated deterrence in the Indo-Pacific region. At the heart of this debate is whether and how measures to deter North Korea ranging from strengthening U.S. extended deterrence, to tightening U.S.-Japan-South Korea trilateral cooperation, to developing indigenous South Korean nuclear weapons might affect regional stability in the Indo-Pacific. I argue that in an increasingly networked security architecture, linkages across conflicts will become more apparent. As such, policymakers should identify linkages between integrated deterrence in the Indo-Pacific and nuclear deterrence on the Korean Peninsula and consider how strengthening deterrence in one area exacerbates or mitigates deterrence in other conflicts. To better situate North Korean deterrence within a framework of Indo-Pacific deterrence, policymakers should continue developing U.S.-Japan-South Korea trilateral cooperation as a platform for addressing broader Indo-Pacific issues. I also suggest how conflict in the Taiwan Strait carries important implications for the U.S. alliance system in the Indo-Pacific (including the U.S.-South Korea alliance) and aggravates tensions on the Korean Peninsula, highlighting the need for greater planning and coordination among allies.