Citing what it calls U.S. “hostile policy” against North Korea, Pyongyang has repeatedly rebuffed U.S. and South Korean efforts to begin talks on promoting denuclearization and building peace on the Korean Peninsula. The reasons for the North’s refusal so far to engage include its pandemic lockdown, its apparent belief that it can muddle through its economic crisis without an agreement, its ability to evade sanctions with help from China and Russia, and most fundamentally its determination to continue building up its nuclear and missile capabilities. Despite the highly competitive state of Sino-American relations, the Biden administration should continue to press China to use its influence in Pyongyang to bring the North Koreans to the negotiating table. It should also do what it can to promote stronger enforcement of existing U.N. sanctions, maintain U.S.-ROK solidarity in the face of DPRK efforts to split the allies, and demonstrate that the North’s refusal to negotiate will only reinforce the allies’ resolve to strengthen their defense capabilities. And it should make a more detailed and effective case for its balanced, realistic negotiating position, both to increase North Korean receptivity and to motivate China and others to press the North to negotiate seriously. But realistically, U.S. leverage to bring North Korea to the negotiating table is limited. Prospects for getting talks underway in 2022 will depend mainly on Kim Jong Un and on his calculations of whether negotiated sanctions relief is essential to alleviate the North’s economic predicament; whether he can count on continued support from China (including in evading sanctions); and whether an agreement can be reached that leaves his nuclear deterrent largely intact while delivering substantial economic and other benefits. Negotiations could possibly begin in the first half of 2022 if pandemic concerns subside. But the United States and South Korea must be prepared for the eventuality that the North continues to resist engagement or engages but makes demands that preclude any agreement. In that event – or even if partial deals can be reached – the two countries must continue to maintain alliance solidarity and strengthen their deterrence capabilities for the foreseeable future.