This dissertation first aims to identify the ideal political conditions necessary to make Inter-Korean relations and U.S.-DPRK relations conducive. Using Coplin’s Decision Making Theory; the author will formulate a foundational three-levels of analysis IR alignment foreign policy framework on North Korea for the respective conservative and liberal parties in the United States and South Korea. This approach will require speech analysis of all August 15th Liberation Day speeches and U.S. State of the Union Addresses from the start of the Sunshine Policy to the present day; the five inter-Korean summits and their respective declarations; as well as the foreign policy trends between the conservative and liberal governments in South Korea and the United States. The author has found that Liberal leaders and their political parties in both countries utilize Liberal Institutionalism at the Individual-level; Commercial Peace Theory or the Democratic Peace Theory at the State-level; and Global Multilateralism or Regional Multilateralism at the International-level when dealing with North Korea. In contrast; conservative leaders and their parties utilize Neoconservatism or Offensive Realism at the Individual-level; Hegemonic Stability Theory at the State-level; and either Regional Multilateralism or Unilateralism at the International-level. Previous academic studies on the subject presents a scattered realist view of individual leaders and their foreign policy; but never a comprehensive constructivist review of multiple leaders during a much longer time span of 25 years; nor have attempts looked at the North Korean reactions to these speeches. The author found that a combination of sanctions; military provocations; and natural disasters like typhoons and floods may have also forced North Korea to soften its approach and join South Korea for the inter-Korean summits. The author’s findings also found that the preferable political conditions necessary to make Inter-Korean relations and U.S.-DPRK relations conducive is a conservative president in the United States and a liberal president in South Korea (specifically the combination of an offensive realist-to-liberal institutionalist; hegemonic stability theorist-to-commercial peace theorist; and a unilateralist-to-regional multilateralist). Finally; the author will conclude with some policy recommendations for the incoming U.S. administration; depending on whether a conservative or a liberal president is elected in 2024.

"TABLE OF CONTENTS iv
LIST OF FIGURES ix
LIST OF TABLES x
LIST OF ACRONYMS xi
ABSTRACT .. xiv
CHAPTER 1 – CONTEXTUALIZING INTER-KOREAN AND U.S.-DPRK ENGAGEMENT . 1
1.1 Introduction . 1
1.2 Historical Background 1
1.3 Dissertation Objective and Hypothesis 8
1.4 Significance of Research and Contribution to the Field . 10
1.5 Why 1990s-2000s and 2010s-2020s? . 11
Summit Diplomacy . 11
Military Manpower and Expenditure. 13
Cross-Border Travel . 20
1.6 Favorable Conditions for Successful Engagement with North Korea . 22
1.7 A Liberal Foreign Policy Framework 30
1.8 A Conservative Foreign Policy Framework 32
1.9 Dissertation Outline . 34
1.10 Conclusion .. 35
CHAPTER 2 – LITERATURE REVIEW AND SPEECH METHODOLOGY OF THE U.S.-DPRK AND INTER-KOREAN FOREIGN POLICY 37
2.1 Introduction .. 37
2.2 Literature Review .. 37
2.2.1 The Role of the President as Diplomat .. 37
The Importance of Presidential Speeches . 40
The Structure of Decision-Making 42
2.2.2 The Role of Domestic Politics on Foreign Policy . 44
Bureaucratic Politics .. 44
Public Opinion 47
2.2.3 Economic and Military Capability .. 49
North Korea’s Security Dilemma .. 49
The U.S.’s Nuclear Challenge. 52
South Korea’s Failed Diplomatic Initiative . 55
2.2.4 Rationality in Diplomatic Conduct .. 58
North Korea a Rational Actor? .. 58
Madman Theory and Irrationality 60
2.3 Limitations on the Literature .. 63
2.4 Methodology of the Speech Analysis .. 67
Speech Analysis .. 68
2.5 Conclusion . 72
CHAPTER 3 – CONSERVATIVE FOREIGN POLICY TRENDS IN SOUTH KOREA AND THE U.S. 74
3.1 Introduction .. 74
3.2 Conservative Schools of Thought . 74
Neoconservatism 74
Classical Realism vs. Neorealism and Realism on Democratization .. 77
Defensive vs. Offensive Realism . 79
3.3 Hegemonic Stability Theory 84
3.4 Unilateralism 89
3.5 Multilateralism or Lack Thereof .. 92
3.6 Conclusion . 98
CHAPTER 4 – LIBERAL FOREIGN POLICY TRENDS IN SOUTH KOREA AND THE U.S. . 99
4.1 Introduction .. 99
4.2 Liberal Schools of Thought . 99
Liberalism . 99
Liberal Institutionalism 100
4.3 Commercial Peace Theory vs. Democratic Peace Theory 102
Commercial Peace Theory . 102
Democratic Peace Theory .. 109
4.4 Global or Regional Multilateralism .. 112
4.5 Conclusion .. 117
CHAPTER 5 – INTER-KOREAN SUMMITS AND SPEECHES SINCE SUNSHINE 119
5.1 Introduction 119
5.2 June 15th, 2000 Joint Declaration . 119
5.3 October 4th, 2007 Joint Declaration . 122
5.4 Panmunjom Declaration . 128
5.5 May Inter-Korean Summit . 134
5.6 Pyongyang Joint Declaration .. 137
5.7 Kim’s Liberation Day Speeches .. 141
1998: The Start of the People’s Government 142
2000: The First Inter-Korean Summit . 143
2002: Follow the June 15th Declaration . 144
Kim Dae-jung – Dovish or Hawkish? .. 145
5.8 Roh’s Liberation Day Speeches .. 146
2003: The Era of Northeast Asia 146
2007: Balanced Pragmatic Diplomacy 147
Roh Moo-hyun – Dovish or Hawkish? . 149
5.9 Lee and Park’s Liberation Day Speeches . 150
Lee Myung-bak . 150
Park Geun-hye . 152
5.10 Moon’s Liberation Day Speeches 154
2017: Prelude to Pyeongchang Peace . 154
2018: The Panmunjom Honeymoon .. 158
2021: An Island Dreams of Connecting to the Continent .. 160
Moon Jae-in – Dovish or Hawkish? 161
5.11 Yoon’s Liberation Day Speeches . 162
5.12 Conclusion 164
CHAPTER 6 – THE U.S.-DPRK SUMMITS AND SPEECHES SINCE SUNSHINE 167
6.1 Introduction 167
6.2 Singapore Declaration (2018).. 167
6.3 Hanoi Summit (2019) 171
6.4 DMZ Summit (2019) . 174
6.5 Clinton’s State of the Union Addresses .. 177
1998: Standing with our Allies . 178
2000: China and the Threat of Nuclear Proliferation . 179
Bill Clinton – Dovish or Hawkish? 180
6.6 G.W. Bush’s State of the Union Addresses .. 181
2001: For Peace and Freedom 181
2002: Axis of Evil 182
2008: Beacon of Hope.. 184
George W. Bush – Dovish or Hawkish? . 186
6.7 Obama’s State of the Union Addresses .. 187
2009: The Beginning of a New Era of Engagement? 187
2016: The Power of American Leadership 189
Barack Obama – Hawkish or Dovish? 191
6.8 Trump’s State of the Union Addresses 192
2017 – Rebuilding America, Respect America . 193
2020 – America Stands for Freedom 194
Donald Trump – Hawkish or Dovish? . 196
6.9 Biden’s State of the Union Addresses . 197
2021 – Diplomacy, Deterrence, and China? 198
2023 – The Threat of Russia and China . 199
Joe Biden – Hawkish or Dovish? 201
6.10 Conclusion 202
CHAPTER 7 – ARTIFICIAL AND NATURAL INFLUENCES ON DPRK RELATIONS SINCE SUNSHINE 206
7.1 Introduction 206
7.2 The Role of Policies and Sanctions .. 206
Clinton’s Policy on Asia . 206
G.W. Bush’s Policy on Asia .. 210
Obama’s Policy on Asia .. 211
Trump’s Policy on Asia 213
Biden’s Policy on Asia . 216
The Geopolitical Context of Initiating Sunshine . 218
Sanctions on North Korea .. 220
7.3 The Role of U.S.-ROK Military Exercises . 221
7.4 “Tides of Change” – The Role of Natural Disasters .. 224
Sunshine-Era Disasters 224
Moon-Era Natural Disasters 227
7.5 Conclusion .. 228
CHAPTER 8 – CONCLUSION AND POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE U.S. 230
8.1 Introduction 230
8.2 Determining the U.S.-ROK Presidents’ North Korea Policy .. 230
8.3 Successes and Failures: Lessons Learned from the Kim, Roh, and Moon Era .. 234
The Failure of Sunshine and Six Party Talks 234
The Failure of Moonshine .. 239
Narrowing the Period of Engagement . 240
Ideal Political Conditions for Engagement .. 243
8.4 Policy Recommendations on North Korea for the Incoming Republican Administration 244
8.5 Policy Recommendations on North Korea for the Incoming Democratic Administration 249
8.6 Conclusion .. 253
BIBLIOGRAPHY .. 255
APPENDIX 1 . 277
APPENDIX 2 . 287
APPENDIX 3 ."