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핵개발 전략이 핵협상에 미치는 영향 : 이란과 북한 사례를 중심으로

The impact of the Nuclear development strategy on the Nuclear Negotiations : Focusing on Iran and North Korea,

상세내역
저자 김재희
학위 박사
소속학교 한국외국어대학교
전공 정치외교학과
발행연도 2018년
쪽수 247 p.
지도교수 남궁영
키워드 #핵개발 결정요인   #핵 획득전략   #핵 운용전략   #핵협상   #이란   #북한
원문보기
상세내역
초록
Today, as it is called the Second Nuclear Age, nations seeking to possess nuclear weapons and the international community are in constant distress. In order to solve problems related to nuclear weapons, the international community has proposed coercive or conciliatory solutions through cooperation.
However, because the development motives and strategies of potential nuclear states are different from each other, the solution of solving the nuclear issue is not applied in a lump. Therefore, analyzing the motives for development (WHY) and nuclear acquisition and operation strategies (HOW) of these potential nuclear states could be the first step to solve the nuclear problem. Therefore, the purposes of this study are to examine the factors that influence the nuclear negotiations by examining the motives, nuclear acquisition and operation strategies of the potential nuclear states and to suggest measures for concluding nuclear negotiations.
The main determinants of Iran's nuclear development are security threats and regional hegemony. The most dangerous factor in Iran's security situation was Iraq in the 1980's and then Israel as a major threat. The Iran Iraq war that broke out in 1980 led to Iran's decision to pursue a nuclear arsenal. After that, the enrichment of neighboring countries and hostile countries, and the provision of US nuclear umbrella contributed to the further development of Iran's nuclear development. Since Iran began nuclear development as a "nuclear program for peace" supported by the West, the initial nuclear weapons acquisition strategy was a hedging strategy. Since then, the Islamic Republic's nuclear acquisition strategy has been a hiding strategy to avoid international sanctions and surveillance. The nuclear operation strategy can be regarded as a catalytic that regards Russia as a sponsor country. In Russia, however, depending on whether it has a relationship with the West, it may or may not help Iran. Therefore, it is prudent for Iran to choose a catalytic strategy against Russia. For asymmetric escalation strategy, Iran is not exposed to serious security threats at present, so it is unlikely to choose this strategy. Recalling that Iran's supreme leader takes control of the military, a assured retaliation strategy is the most likely strategy to choose. In addition, since Iran's nuclear target is deterred by its opponents' use of nuclear weapons, a strategy that can be controlled from a central point is more appropriate.
North Korea felt a serious security threat when it was reported that the US could use nuclear weapons at the time of the Korean War and then started nuclear development. Therefore, the main driver of North Korea's nuclear development is related to security. In addition, it has some purposes of maintaining the regime, making a leap in conventional military force with South Korea, guaranteeing military security, normalizing relations with the United States, and improving negotiating power for normal status. The Kim Il Sung regime, with the support of the Soviet Union in the name of energy development, started a nuclear program despite the opposition of the Soviet Union. In particular, the Soviet Union, which was in conflict with the United States during the Cold War, built a strategy to pursue a barrier and continued nuclear weapon development. The Kim Jong-il regime has also pursued nuclear development in spite of international condemnation and sanctions, and has chosen the strategy of hiding in order to avoid the sanctions of the international community. Since then, the Kim Jong-Eun government has completed the nuclear development through the hiding strategy and reached the nuclear test. North Korea's nuclear strategy is a catalytic strategy to place the Soviet Union and China as a powerful sponsor. As long as North Korea does not deteriorate its relationship with China, it is unlikely to choose the strategies of assured retaliation or asymmetric escalation. In the case of assured retaliation, North Korea's leadership can pick it up because it is possible to take control of the military. However, not the actual use of nuclear weapons, but just the nuclear threat can not be passed on to the United States, and the asymmetric escalation type has not the possibility of being chosen in the case that North Korea's second-strike is not proved. Therefore, it is the best choice for Kim Jong-Eun regime to resolve the situation through the intervention of the sponsoring powers when threatening to use nuclear armed forces.
The impact on Iran and North Korea's nuclear negotiations can be largely divided into international factors and domestic factors. In the case of Iran, international political factors include the US policy toward Iran, the role of the European Union in mediation, and Israel's willingness to actively negotiate with the nuclear powers. Domestic political factors include the change of power from hard-core to mid-moderate conservatives, serious economic hardship, and public opinion of Iranian people who want to reform and open up. North Korea has international political factors such as US policy toward North Korea, China's involvement, and South Korean government's North Korea policy. Domestic political factors include the maintenance of the system and the economic difficulties derived from international sanctions.
The international and domestic political factors that have influenced the Iranian and North Korean nuclear development processes have been parameters that affect the nuclear negotiations of these countries along with nuclear development decision factors, nuclear acquisition and nuclear operation strategies.
The nuclear issues of Iran and North Korea today have become common ones for the international community to solve together. Before presenting the solution, I think it is desirable to solve the nuclear problem by examining the causes and processes of starting the nuclear issue and resolving it from the root of the problem. In addition, it is important to build confidence and willingness to resolve the nuclear issues of the parties involved in nuclear negotiations. If two states and the international society go through the transition process from their security assurances and the resolution of the problems connected with survival to the transparent nuclear disarmament demanded by the international community such as the United States, the road map for the solution of the nuclear problem will be completed.
목차
"Ⅰ. 서 론 1
제 1 절. 문제제기와 연구목적 1
제 2 절. 연구대상과 연구방법 5
제 3 절. 선행연구 검토 11
제 4 절. 논문의 구성과 분석틀 17
Ⅱ. 이론적 고찰 20
제 1 절. 핵개발 단계와 개발요인 21
1. 핵개발 8단계 21
2. 핵개발 결정요인 26
제 2 절. 핵무기 획득전략 35
1. 위험회피전략(Hedging) 36
2. 전속력질주전략(Sprinting) 39
3. 은폐전략(Hiding) 39
4. 방호벽추구전략(Sheltered Pursuit) 40
제 3 절. 핵무기 운용전략 43
1. 핵무기 운용전략의 개념 43
2. 촉매형(Catalytic) 49
3. 확증보복형(Assured Retaliation) 50
4. 비대칭확전형(Asymmetric Escalation) 52
Ⅲ. 핵무기 개발 사례국가 56
제 1 절. 핵 보유 국가 56
1. 인도 58
(1) 핵개발 전개과정 58
(2) 핵개발 결정요인 59
(3) 핵 획득전략 60
(4) 핵 운용전략 62
2. 파키스탄 63
(1) 핵개발 전개과정 63
(2) 핵개발 결정요인 64
(3) 핵 획득전략 65
(4) 핵 운용전략 66
제 2 절. 핵 포기 국가 67
1. 남아프리카공화국 68
(1) 핵개발 전개과정 68
(2) 핵개발 결정요인 71
(3) 핵 획득전략 72
(4) 핵 포기과정 73
2. 우크라이나 74
(1) 핵개발 전개과정 74
(2) 핵개발 결정요인 76
(3) 핵 획득전략 76
(4) 핵 포기과정 77
3. 리비아 79
(1) 핵개발 전개과정 79
(2) 핵개발 결정요인 81
(3) 핵 획득전략 82
(4) 핵 포기과정 83
Ⅳ. 이란의 핵무기 개발 전개과정 89
제 1 절. 핵개발 단계에 따른 결정요인 90
1. 1단계 - 기술적 능력의 보유 90
(1) 핵개발의 시작 90
(2) 핵개발 결정요인 91
2. 2단계 - 연구용 또는 발전용 원자로의 보유 93
(1) 핵시설 기반 마련 93
(2) 핵개발 결정요인 94
3. 3단계 - 핵 제조용 물질의 보유 98
(1) 본격적 핵무기 제조 98
(2) 핵개발 결정요인 99
4. 4단계 - 비밀리 핵폭탄 제조 99
(1) 핵무기 연료주기 완성 99
(2) 핵개발 결정요인 100
제 2 절. 핵무기 획득전략 104
1. 위험회피전략 - 팔레비 왕조 106
2. 은폐전략 - 이슬람 정권 108
제 3 절. 핵무기 운용전략 109
1. 촉매형 110
2. 확증보복형 112
3. 비대칭확전형 114
Ⅴ. 북한의 핵무기 개발 전개과정 116
제 1 절. 핵개발 단계에 따른 결정요인 116
1. 1단계 - 기술적 능력의 보유 117
(1) 핵개발의 시작 117
(2) 핵개발 결정요인 120
2. 2단계 - 연구용 또는 발전용 원자로의 보유 121
(1) 핵시설 기반 마련 121
(2) 핵개발 결정요인 123
3. 3단계 - 핵 제조용 물질의 보유 129
(1) 본격적 핵무기 제조 129
(2) 핵개발 결정요인 132
4. 4단계 - 비밀리 핵폭탄 제조 133
(1) 핵무기 연료주기 완성 133
(2) 핵개발 결정요인 135
5. 5단계 - 공개적 핵폭발 실험 실시 136
(1) 핵무기 제조 완성 136
(2) 핵개발 결정요인 138
제 2 절. 핵무기 획득전략 141
1. 방호벽추구전략 - 김일성 정권 142
2. 방호벽추구 및 은폐전략 - 김정일 정권 144
3. 은폐전략 - 김정은 정권 146
제 3 절. 핵무기 운용전략 147
1. 촉매형 147
(1) 러시아 147
(2) 중국 150
2. 확증보복형 및 비대칭확전형 151
Ⅵ. 핵협상 전개과정과 내용 152
제 1 절. 이란의 핵협상 152
1. 핵협상 이전의 상황 153
(1) 이란의 IAEA 위반 153
(2) 이란에 대한 국제사회의 제재 155
2. 핵협상과 후속 이행과정 157
(1) 핵협상 내용 157
(2) 핵협상 이행과정 161
제 2 절. 북한의 핵협상 163
1. 제1차 북핵 위기와 제네바 합의 165
2. 제2차 북핵 위기와 9.19 공동성명 168
3. 핵실험과 국제사회의 대응 171
4. 6차 핵실험 이후와 4.27 판문점 선언 177
Ⅶ. 핵협상에 영향을 준 요인 180
제 1 절. 이란 핵협상에 영향을 준 요인 180
1. 국제정치적 요인 181
(1) 미국의 대(對)이란 정책 181
(2) 유럽연합(European Union) 186
(3) 이스라엘 188
2. 국내정치적 요인 190
(1) 국내정치적 상황 190
(2) 국제사회의 제재로 인한 경제난 193
(3) 여론: 개혁개방을 원하는 이란 민중 195
제 2 절. 북한 핵협상에 영향을 준 요인 197
1. 국제정치적 요인 198
(1) 미국의 대북 정책 199
(2) 중국의 관여 203
(3) 한국정부의 대북정책 205
2. 국내정치적 요인 206
(1) 체제 유지 206
(2) 국제사회의 제재로부터 파생된 경제난 207
제 3 절. 이란과 북한의 핵협상에 영향을 준 요인 비교 208
Ⅷ. 결 론 218
참고문헌 223
Abstract 242"