In the first year of his Regime in 2012 Kim Jong-un (KJU) decided to break the 2/29 US-North Korea Agreement or the Leap Day Deal by launching a long-range ballistic missile Taepodong-2 followed by four nuclear tests and 60 ballistic missile launches. This ultimately led the KJU Regime to successfully launch ICBM in November 2017 and to declare the completion of its nuclear program. During this time North Korea concentrated all the authority of the Supreme Leader as well as its entire national capacity to achieve nuclear power advancement. The core of ‘nuclear power advancement’ is the weaponization of the delivery vehicles by mounting nuclear warheads thus ultimately completing ICBM capability that can reach the entire mainland US. The coercion of the United States the world’s only superpower was clearly anticipated. North Korea however advanced its nuclear delivery vehicle that can directly target the mainland US in order to achieve its strategic intentions and goals which is nearly impossible for any other country to take such actions. How can we explain this academically? This is the key question and purpose of this study.In response to the question against the pressures and sanctions posed by the United States who have been continuously underestimating and disregarding North Korea’s nuclear capabilities the new leader Kim Jong-un wanted to strengthen his bargaining power by advancing nuclear delivery vehicle that can threaten the mainland US and its people. This is because if the KJU Regime complies with the US coercion they must first abandon its nuclear program which meant the end of Kim’s hereditary regime. Therefore KJU achieved his strategic goal by carefully and seamlessly constructing the ‘Five Year Plan for Nuclear Power Advancement’ realizing that he cannot deal with the US with the nuclear power he inherited from his predecessors. This study aims to develop the Coercive Theory an international political theory that has been developed in the United States from the perspective of weaker power North Korea. The study first defined North Korea’s nuclear power advancement and its counter-coercive strategy as KJU’s survival strategy against the US sanctions pressures and denuclearization-first policy. The research results were derived by analyzing the mechanism and the cause and effect of the following the advancement of nuclear capability (independent variable) which is the key factor that affects the current status change increased the bargaining power (dependent variable) after forcible threat recognition mechanism process (parameter). Pyongyang never attempted to surrender attack or negotiate with Washington on the US coercion (pressures and sanctions) against North Korea’s nuclear power advancement effort. Instead the KJU Regime highly concentrated on completing its nuclear capability to strengthen Pyongyang’s bargaining power which is defined as North Korea’s counter-coercive strategy. The result of studying North Korea’s counter-coercive strategy under the analytic frame of ‘method-mechanism-goal’ is the following North Korea has achieved its strategic goals by revealing and showing off its advanced nuclear delivery vehicle (actual capability) which forcibly led the US to increase (credibility deterrence) the level of threat recognition (compellence) thus resulting (compellence-deterrence-coercion) in the change of behavior and actions towards the Regime. The so-called [compellence→deterrence⇒counter-coercion] mechanism which forced the United States to recognize the threat of the Regime’s advanced capability was the key requirement for the success of North Korea’s counter-coercive strategy. Such mechanism was the key factor in achieving its strategic goal of strengthening bargaining power by successfully leveraging the ICBM threat as the pressure points against the US vital interest (its territory and the people) the Regime added the synergy to the change the perception of the US towards North Korea’s nuclear capability.?Through the counter-coercion strategy the KJU Regime completed its nuclear power advancement and further strengthened nuclear deterrence capability which as a result strengthened its bargaining power against the US. Such cause and effect is currently affecting the ongoing denuclearization talks between Pyongyang and Washington which is expected to last for a considerable amount of time. Nuclear power advancement under the KJU Regime however has led the US and international community to pose fierce sanctions and pressures (coercion) against North Korea paradoxically causing the serious economic crisis which led the Regime to face a national security dilemma nuclear power versus economic power. Serious tasks are ahead of us as the nuclear talks continue we would need to prepare for potential military actions taken due to the stability-instability paradox and possible nuclear domino effect in East Asia while urgently finding the right solution against the advancement of North Korea’s nuclear program.
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