The major concern of this research focuses on why nuclear weapons have been proliferated in spite of the U.S. effort to prevent their spread through its non-proliferation policy, pursued unilaterally and multilaterally. To determine the causes of proliferation, this dissertation concentrates on two conditions, necessary and sufficient conditions. In other words, to transcend from aspiring nuclear states to nuclear states depends on the relationships between the necessary condition of the aspirant to be a nuclear state and the sufficient condition of the non-proliferation policy of US to stop the spread of nukes.
What this research concentrates on especially the U.S. non-proliferation policy is attributed that it has regarded non-proliferation policy as a national policy. We know that the U.S. was reasonable for passing the bills related to non-proliferation and making the international regimes to constrain or control the proliferation. Also, U.S. put its primary interest on stopping the threat of nuclear proliferation by 'rogue states' after the disappearance of rival, USSR, thanks to the end of cold war. Therefore, it is very important to analyze the influence and function of US non-proliferation policy.
Therefore, this dissertation examines whether the U.S. non-proliferation policy has functioned positively or negatively as a tool of stopping nuclear proliferation. Unfortunately, U.S. non-proliferation policy has lost coherency in pursuing the objective of prohibiting the spread of latent nuclear states because the importance of pursuing non-proliferation policy was determined by the change of foreign policy.
Therefore, this study tries to link the lack of coherency of U.S. non-proliferation policy with the key of transcending the latency of nuclear status. Again, the coherency of U.S. non-proliferation policy will determine whether the aspirants will be permitted or not becoming one of the nuclear states.
For proving this argument, the thesis uses the North Korean case as well as cases of other latent nuclear states to see whether they cross over the border of being a nuclear state or not. In order to predict where Pyoung-yang will go concerning the nuclear problem in the future, it was necessary to know the cause of incoherency of US non-proliferation policy by examining many cases. Through those cases, the paper draws a generality of the cause of incoherency on the US non-proliferation policy and links the uniqueness of each latent nuclear state, especially DPRK.
For the linkage between generality and specialty, it needs a modeling to explain the relationship between the necessary condition and sufficient condition in addition to the political regime of aspirant which brought into the difficulty of negotiation to deal with the nuclear problem.
According to the modeling, first, the aspiring nuclear state will determine whether to develop the nuclear weapons by estimating the threat caused by the swift change of internal and external environment. When the situation of necessary condition builds up, U.S. will lay out the proper policy to respond. But what is import ant in this process is that U.S. has dealt with the latent nuclear states differently in accordance with the regional interest. Therefore, if the sufficient condition of U.S. non-proliferation policy on the ability of aspirant has a negative effect, the proliferant can get the opportunity to cross over the line of nuclear states. Even though U.S. tries to respond positively on the proliferant because of regional interest, if US would lost the positive action on the latent nuclear state as the regional interest changes as a result of the international or regional environment, if U.S. also opted for an easy political access instead of technological access to overcome its vulnerability on the negotiation of closing nuclear development because aspirant regime is not democracy, which gives the aspirant independent behavior and voice on the process of negotiation, then the aspiring nuclear states will issue the nuclear problem again someday. Therefore, U.S. should keep the coherency of non-proliferation policy on even the aspirant which was bound up not to develope nuclear weapons by its non-proliferation policy.
With this framework, this dissertation tries to show the cause of Pyoung-yang's nuclear development, the US policy to control and prevent North Korea's nuclear development and the dynamics of the negotiation between the two to resolve the Pyoung-yang's nuclear issue.
U.S. was so principled to follow the procedure of NPT that it could not catch the opportunity to roll back North Korea's nuclear problem. Thanks to the U.S.'s late response, Pyoung-yang earned six years enough to develope nuclear weapons until it contracts IAEA safeguards after having entered the NPT. So, the suspicion of nuclear weapons raised more questions instead of apparent answer. US supported technological approach, the special inspection of IAEA and the mutual inspection between the South and North Koreas. But after North Korea declared its withdrawal from NPT, US amended the non-proliferation policy on North Korea. US accepted North Korea's request for rewards which are two 1,000MW light water reactors, supply of heavy oil and the effort to normalize the relationship between the two at the cost of closing current and future nuclear development. But the Agreed Framework allows North Korea to postpone the verification of past nuclear capability through IAEA's special inspection. Therefore, the question of North Korea's nuclear weapon still remains.
U.S. lost the opportunity to clean out the suspicion of the aspiring nuclear state through the special inspection and its reliable threat of military action when U.S. gave up the coherent policy to stop or roll back the nuclear development. This attitude on non-proliferation policy influenced negatively on the actor's future behavior as well as the behavior of such cases as India and Pakistan. The non-proliferation policy can be revised easily to make the latent proliferants consider the benefit of issuing nuclear development or testing nuclear weapons. For example, the Indian and Pakistan nuclear tests in May, 1998, North Korea's Missile test in August, 1998 and the issue surrounding underground facilities in Kum-chang-ri that same year can be thought of as the result of lack of coherent non-proliferation policy.
In conclusion, US non-proliferation policy should not end at getting the would-be nuclear state to enter the NPT. US must pursue with the follow up measures to clean out the suspicion of nuclear development. Also, the content of non-proliferation policy must not be revised in accordance with regional interest. The non-proliferation policy has to carve out its own independent sphere, not interrupted by the change of foreign policy. Otherwise, the latent proliferants will not quit risking nuclear development because they can endure the cost.
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