While Central and East European countries have been experiencing post-communism following the collapse of their socialist regimes, China and North Korea have sustained their socialist regimes. Nonetheless, some important changes have occurred in China and North Korea; dichotomized social differentiation has advanced between the official sector, dominated by socialist ideology, and the unofficial sector, which is not allowed by the dominant ideology. Since the decision on reform and opening-up in the Third Plenary Session of the Eleventh Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in December, 1978, various social changes have occurred in China. Meanwhile, a partial reform was attempted in North Korea, following the adoption of the Joint-Venture Act in 1984, yet, in contrast to China, there was no rapid economic development. Although North Korea is not revealing any signs of regime change, many different domestic and international issues remain appending, which weaken the security of the regime.
Accordingly, with a focus on social integration and social regulation, this study explores the survival of the Chinese and North Korean socialist regimes, in contrast to the demise of the Central and East European socialist regimes, in the context of the mechanism of social control and complementary role of Confucian values in the norms of social control. In other words, the current study analyzes how the mechanism of social control is exercised in China and North Korea, and how political stability and social control are achieved through the complementary impact of Confucian values on the weakened dominant ideology. Given that the socialist ideology has seriously lost its efficacy as regards social regulation and social integration, an association with socialist culture is effectively complemented by Confucian values, such as Confucian Familism, collectivism giving priority to society before the individual, ascendancy of the State, obedience to authority and respect to hierarchy, appreciation of study, serious account to ethical norms, emphasis on order and harmony rather than competition and confrontation, diligence and frugality, leaders’ love to serve the people etc.
To achieve a micro-pair-comparison, normative, historico-cultural, positive, and empirical approaches are all utilized. Meanwhile, the differences in the roles of Confucian values in China and North Korea are elucidated using analogous and heterologous approaches.
In the case of China, the time focus is subsequent to the Third Plenary Session of the Eleventh Central Committee of the CCP in 1978, whereas for North Korea, it is post the adoption of the Joint-Venture Act in 1984. Nonetheless, assuming that the social differentiation and political changes following the reform and opening-up were influenced by the previous exclusion of Confucian values during the socialist regime-building and implementation of values creating and developing the leadership, there is an inevitable influence from the time prior to the reform and opening-up.
Although the Chinese and North Korean leaderships have both criticized Confucian culture as a vestige of feudalism, they still put it to practical use, where the Chinese have applied Confucian values as a form of normative control, while the North Koreans have used them in an active way to create and exercise sovereign power. However, this difference in applying Confucian values may explain the current divergence in reform, opening-up, and the succession of leadership between the two countries.
Consequently, this study analyzes the dualistic social differentiation in China and North Korea using Hankiss' criteria to explain a late communist society, with the exception of two criteria on elite behavior: Homogeneity versus Differentiation & Integration, Vertical versus Horizontal Organization, Descendance versus Ascendance, Statization versus Nonstatization, Centralization versus Noncentralization, Political versus Socioeconomic Dominance, and Ideology versus No Ideology.
This study also compares how the distinctive "system-foreign" organizational principles in China and North Korea impact the economic sphere, as well as public life, cultural life, social consciousness, and the field of social and political interaction.
The Chinese active reform policy has adopted a considerable share of the "second social sphere" into the "first social sphere". However, the North Korean immaterial reform has only given a tacit consent to a tiny part of the "second social sphere". Gaining legal status from the Chinese active reform policy, various elements of the "second social sphere" have been able to apply pressure to the socialist regime in China. Yet, since North Korea has not followed the same course of reform and opening-up, the "second society" continues as an unofficial and illegal social sector, with only latent pressure.
In China and North Korea, Confucian values have contributed to social integration and social regulation in the dichotomous social differentiation. As such, when the Chinese and North Korean value systems were challenged by capitalist values, Familism and other Confucian values provided a supplementary social binding force for the weakened socialist ideology. Therefore, this study compares how the Chinese and North Korean leaderships have controlled their differentiated society using the mechanism and norms of social control. As regards the mechanism of social control for direct/indirect control in China and North Korea, this study compares the organizationof the Party and State, economic policy, control of population displacement, management and control of labor forces, and repression apparatus, such as political prison camps.
For a long time, the Chinese and North Korean State and Party organizations have controlled the distribution of the means of production and resources, thereby maintaining an influence in every social sector. Yet, the reform policy in China introduced diverse non-public ownership, along with macro adjustments and controls on the means of production and resources by the State, which in turn has led to rational adjustments and resource distribution by the market. In the case where the work-units(danwei) and trade unions(gonghui) have not been fulfilling their function efficiently, the Chinese government has transformed its direct control into indirect and macro control by strengthening the roll of the residential-units(shequ), administrative offices of the quarter(Jiedaobanshichu), and Neighborhood Committees(Juminweiyuanhui). However, in North Korea, despite widespread collapse, the Party and State still wield strong and direct control, where the vertical and horizontal social controls are held by the "National Security and Integrity Agency"(Gukgaanjeonbowibu), the "Ministry of Public Safety"(Inminboanseong), the "Committee of National Censorship"(Gukgageomyeolwiwonhoe), the "Guidance Committee for a Legal Socialist Life"(Sahoejueuibeopmusaenghwaljidowiwonhoe), and the "People's Neighborhood Association"(Inminban) etc. Thus, with only a few exceptional cases, the instructions and guidance of the Party still control daily life in North Korea.
This study also pays attention to the normative control in both societies. In the case of China, this covers "the Construction of a Socialist Culture with Chinese Characteristics", "Governing the State with Virtue", "Harmonized Society", "Study Oriented Society", and "Serving People" etc. Meanwhile, the normative control in North Korea covers the Juche ideology, "Scio-Political Vitality", and "the Family transforms into the State"(an organic perception of the family-state) as the Confucian values utilized in the political socialization to transform the relationship of the leader and the people into that of father and son, and thus to enforce the Kim Il-song and Kim Jong-il regime.
For the contours and pillars of political change, this study examines "Socialism with Chinese Characteristics" and pragmatism in China versus "Our Style of Socialism" and utilitarianism in North Korea, as well as the constitutional amendments and modifications of the power structure.
Giving first priority to the growth of productivity, the Chinese leadership has reformed the economic system and introduced market forces. As regards respecting the "Four Basic Principles", the Party and State of China have reduced their direct control and attempted a series of limited political reforms. Furthermore, the new leadership and the newly immerged dominant ideology have instigated a "Three-Representative" system to reinforce the Party’s leadership and safety of the socialist regime. Accordingly, the complementary role of Confucian values in relation to the socialist dominant ideology will be strengthened as time goes by. Thus, to consolidate the legitimacy of the socialist regime, the political power will be decentralized to a certain extent, although fundamental political reform towards pluralistic democratization is not expected.
In response to internal and external crises, the North Korean leadership invented "Our Style of Socialism" based on the Juche ideology, and successively proclaimed the "Red Fag", "March in Hardship", and "Strong and Great State". Consequently, the use of Confucian values will continue in North Korea.
In conclusion, this comparative study offers an optimistic outlook for North Korean political change, in spite of the anxiety of the North Korean leaders. The current strong control mechanism cannot be sustained in a decomposing society. Instead, the eventual reform and opening-up of North Korea will enlarge the second social sphere and encourage a certain level of civil autonomy. However, the North Korean leadership will still attempt to sustain a balance between the development of civil autonomy and effective control.
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