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북한 '청년동맹' 의 정치적 역할에 관한 연구

(A)study on the political role of the 'Youth league' in North Korea

상세내역
저자 김종수
학위 박사
소속학교 동국대학교 대학원
전공 북한학과
발행연도 2007년
쪽수 392
지도교수 고유환
키워드 #김종수   # 정치 동맹[政治同盟]   # 청년 동맹[靑年同盟]
원문보기
상세내역
초록
While most of outside commentators have expressed concern about the near future of North Korea mainly because of its unabated political-economic difficulties since the 1990s, the North Korea itself not only has clamored for 'the strong and powerful nation' but also has made display of 'its survival'. Where do such a 'self-confidence' of North Korea come from? In order to give an appropriate answer, one may try to analyze various structural facet of North Korea. Among other things, this dissertation sheds the special light on the youth who is the backbone of the society.
The aims of this study is as follows. First of all, it examines the organization and role of the Youth League in North Korea. Through the systematic research of the formation and transformation of the Youth League's organization and role, this study will contribute to elevate one step further the understanding level of the Youth League which remains 'preliminary' in the existing research materials. Secondly, this paper investigates the stability of the North Korean regime by investigating the activities of the Youth League. Comparing the role of youth between North Korea in 1990s which is confronting the crisis of the regime and East Europe during the system transition, this paper makes clear how the Youth League plays a pivotal role of stabilizing the North Korean regime. Thirdly, this study provides a reference for analysis in order to anticipate the transition of political power after the Kim Jung Il era by reconsidering how the Youth League had transformed during the process of power transfer from Kim Il Sung to his son, Kim Jung il.
The Youth League is supposed to organize the youth of age 14-30, counting its number about 5million. Including the members of the Juvenile Corps, the youth forms one third of the whole population, which occupies an important position in quantity. It's scale as a political organization is only next to the Party. It is one of mass organizations that is destined to organize and mobilize the large extent of masses under the Party and the Leader. The Youth League is conspicuous among other mass organizations in a sense that it has the role as the reserves for the future members and leaders of the Party. That is, the Youth League performs its function as the reserves and the transmission belt for the Party.
It was in the Third Congress of 1948 that the Youth League was formally recognized as a transmission belt for the first time by deciding to device the contents and methods of ideological education programme. The Fifth Congress held in 1964 consolidated further the position of the Youth League as the transmission belt by emphasizing the education of revolutionary tradition, loyalty for the Party, Marx-Leninism and class conscience. With the 1971 Sixth Congress as the decisive momentum, the Youth League took the full-fledged responsibility of formating and expanding the ideology of justifying the power succession from Kim Il Sung to Kim Jung Il. The leadership of North Korea was well aware of the role of the youth in a transitional period and kept strict watch on 'erratic and unhealthy thoughts and deed' of the youth. The gradual intrusion of capitalism into the society mainly because of economic difficulties has forced the North Korean leadership to reemphasize the importance of 'continuous revolution' and 'achievement of great Juche revolution' in order to sustain the existing system.
Also the Youth League has established its position as the reserves for the Party since the Fourth Congress of the Party. As mentioned above, it is one of the largest mass organizations including 5million youth ranging the youth of age 14-30. Aside from huge membership, the youth is important element for the maintenance of a certain regime because the young people are susceptible to change which may lead them either towards loyal to or estrange from the existing system. Recruiting the members and cadres of the Party from the Youth League, the North Korea seems to succeed in making use of the youth for its benefit.
Though in a lesser degree after the mid-199s than before, the young people in North Korea are still enthusiastic in learning 'one and only ideology' and practicing the policy and line of the Party through the 'life and learning programme' of the Youth League. Entrusted by the Party the Youth League guides the activities of the Chosen Juvenile Corps with the aim of inspiring the latter with the mind of adaptability and loyalty to the Party.
Among other classes or organizations the Youth League is paramount to play a role as a 'vanguard' of protecting the regime and materializing the directives from Kim Jung Il. As the crisis of the regime intensified since 1990s the North Korean leadership began to proliferating the discourse of 'importance of the youth', made the youth day and added Kim Il Sung before the title of the Youth League.
With the economic and financial difficulties deepening, the Youth League also was mobilized in those fields. Sine the foundation of the 'Speed Battle Youth Shock Guard' in 1975 the mobilization of the youth has been routinized and radicalized. Except economic duty, the 'Speed Battle Youth Shock Guard' has played active role in educating the youth who is not eligible for the army.
By comparing and analyzing the situation of the transitional era of Kim Il Sung-Kim Jung Il with the recent changes on the youth part, one may predict the possibility of the incoming succession of Kim Jung Il. In the process of the previous succession from Kim Il Sung to Kim Jung Il there were three conspicuous moves of the Youth League: the formation and expansion of 'great revolutionary achievement' discourse, replacement of cadres with young and newly elements, campaign for the 'Three Revolutionary Teams' and resurgence of the Youth Department of the Party. By 2006 one can detect that the very similar phenomenon as before is upsurging. From this one can predict the impending of the power succession of Kim Jung Il.
Accompanying the new emphasis on information, scientific technology and pragmatism, the third generation of revolution belonging to the 30s and 40s in age is emerging. If the First Secretary of the Youth League, Kim Kyung Ho in his 50s is replaced by a young newcomer and a necessity of reshuffle of its major cadres is raised, there is no problem of interpreting them as a 'significant' clue of indicating the imminent power transition in North Korea. Because we already know that there was a precedent during the transition period of Kim Il Sung to Kim Jung Il.
The close examination of the precess of power transfer from Kim Il Sung to Kim Jung Il discloses the fact that the Youth Department of the Party was reemerged - this Department was nullified since the Second Congress of the Party in 1948 - in order to empower the youth and to support the power succession. Now the Youth Department keep the low profile so that some observers doubt its existence itself. Waiting the resurgence of the Youth Department of the Party one can explain it as an indication of power change in North Korea.
It is necessary to gave attention to the leadership of the campaign for the 'Three Revolutionary Teams' which launched its resurgence from 2003. These 'Teams' were the royal guards for pro-Kim Jung Il. There is a probability that Kim Jung Il might reorganize this movement to transfer its lordship to his successor in some point. His successor might use its leaders as his power base of a new regime as well as the foundation of mobilizing the masses for supporting his regime.
Nowadays the North Korea government is standing on a crucial moment to deal with 'crisis' or 'challenge' representing 'the Songun era' and the generation shift. In order to cope with urgent problems, it is unevitable for North Korea to hold firm grip on the youth who is liable to change. Therefore, we can not deny the possibility that North Korea continues to give priority on the youth-centered policy by giving them the role as the vanguard of the regime and master of 'the strong and powerful nation'. The next supreme leader after Kim Jung Il seems to arise from the next Kim Jung Il generation as long as there will be no crucial 'emergence'. One can concludes that the Youth League will be used as the political and organizational core of the post-Kim Jung Il's leadership. As we have seen, the Youth League has accomplished its role as the transmission belt and reserves for the power in North Korea.
목차
Ⅰ장 서론 = 1
1절 연구목적 = 1
2절 연구범위와 연구방법 = 5
1) 연구범위 = 5
2) 연구방법 = 7
3절 청년동맹 역할에 대한 비교연구 = 10
1) 선행연구 검토 = 10
2) 청년동맹과 콤소몰, 공청단의 역할 비교 = 13
Ⅱ장 통일전선과 조선민주청년동맹의 창립·발전 = 42
1절 민청노선 수립과 전개과정 = 42
1) 공청·민청 파쟁(派爭)과 민청 창립 = 42
2) 민청의 비정통(非正統)적 성격 = 55
3) 청년동맹 조직 구조 및 운영 = 71
2절 국가건설 주역으로서의 민청의 역할 = 83
1) 인민위원회 선거와 민청의 선전대 활동 = 83
2) 건국사상총동원운동: 문맹퇴치와 '학생사상기풍개변운동' = 88
3) 현물세완납운동과 청년작업반운동 발기 = 99
Ⅲ장 사회주의 체제수립과 조선사회주의노동청년동맹으로의 발전 = 112
1절 사회주의 개조와 '사로청'으로의 발전 = 112
1) 남북 민청의 통합과 통일전선 재형성 = 112
2) 민청의 사로청으로의 발전 = 119
2절 6·25전쟁과 청년의 총동원 = 137
1) 전시동원 체제와 '청년영웅' 만들기 = 137
2) 전후복구와 동원의 '전투화' = 156
Ⅳ장 권력승계와 조선사회주의노동청년동맹의 역할 = 169
1절 세대교체 담론 형성의 장(場)로서의 사로청 = 169
1) 유일사상체계 확립과 '계속혁명' 담론의 형성·확산 = 169
2) 신진간부의 등장 = 186
2절 권력승계 전위대(前衛隊) 역할 = 199
1) 김정일의 친위대 : 3대혁명소조 = 199
2) 청년운동 전통과 '김정일식' 대중운동의 결합 : 속도전청년돌격대 = 207
Ⅴ장 체제 위기와 청년동맹 = 223
1절 위기의 심화와 '청년중시' 정책 = 223
1) 사회주의 국가들의 몰락의 역사적 교훈 = 224
2) '김일성사회주의청년동맹' 으로의 개명과 '청년절' 제정 = 237
2절 선군시대 청년동맹의 체제수호 역할 = 248
1) 체제 수호의 '전위대' 역할 강화 = 248
2) 경제 건설의 '돌격대' 역할 강화: 동원의 일상화·전투화 = 255
Ⅵ장 청년동맹 조직의 특징과 정치적 역할 변화 = 264
1절 청년동맹 조직의 특징 = 264
1) 청년들의 유일(唯一)·대중(大衆)조직 = 264
2) 수령의 '전위'조직 = 275
2절 청년동맹 정치적 역할 변화의 특징 = 278
1) 인전대 역할 = 278
2) 후비대 역할 = 291
3절 체제변화 주도세력으로서의 가능성: 동유럽 사례와의 비교 = 301
1) 체제변화 요인 = 301
2) 체제변화 주도세력 검토 = 306
3) 평가 = 314
Ⅶ장 결론 = 317
부록: 조선사회주의노동청년동맹 규약 = 321
참고문헌 = 341
ABSTRACT = 387