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북한의 경제·국방 병진노선과 체제위기 극복효과 : 김일성·김정일시대 병진노선의 유형별 비교분석

상세내역
저자 하상섭
학위 박사
소속학교 동국대학교 대학원
전공 북한학과
발행연도 2017년
쪽수 258
지도교수 박순성
키워드 #하상섭   # 북한   # 김일성·김정일시대   # 경제·국방 병진노선   # 유형별 병진노선   # 대내외적 파생효과   # 체제제위기 극복효과
원문보기
상세내역
초록
The purpose of this study is to analyze and evaluate North Korea’s parallel policies of economic-military defense and their effects on overcoming regime crises, i.e., the effectiveness of parallel policies adopted and implemented during the Kim Il-Sung and Kim Jong-Il eras for overcoming regime crises in North Korea. To that end, the study attempts to classify the parallel policies according to their characteristics by the Kim Il-Sung and Kim Jong-Il eras and to analyze internal and external outcomes by type of parallel policies. Based on the findings, the effects of overcoming regime crises by the parallel policies are analyzed and evaluated by type.
During the Kim Il-Sung and Kim Jong-Il eras, different types of parallel policies were implemented: (1) “parallel policy of economic-military defense”(1962–1970), (2) “parallel policy of military-first politics in economic-military defense”(1999–2002), and (3) “military-first economic policy”(2003–2011). Each type of parallel policy had different characteristics.
The “parallel policy of economic-military defense” is defined as a policy that focuses on the national defense, conventional forces, and national defense economy. However, in the defense sector, it changed from having a focus on strengthening the national self-defense(1962) into one with a focus on reinforcing defense cooperation with other countries and a parallel focus on national self-defense(1965-1966). In the economic sector, it changed from having a focus on fortifying a self-supported economy(1962) to strengthening a self-supported economy in parallel with economic cooperation with other countries(1965–1966).
The “parallel policy of military-first politics in economic-military defense” is defined as a policy that focuses on weakening security threats in parallel with strengthening national defense, missile and nuclear power, the national defense economy in parallel with the people’s economy; it also reaffirms support for economic cooperation with other countries in parallel with building a self-supported economy.
The “military-first economic policy” is defined as a policy that focuses on strengthening national defense in parallel with weakening security threats, a focus on reinforcing missile and nuclear power, making the national defense economy stronger, and supporting economic cooperation with other countries in parallel with building a self-supported economy.
Each type of parallel policy has had internal and external effects that demonstrate their characteristic differences. The “parallel policy of economic-military defense” caused implementation of “four principles for military development,” modernization of military strategy, and stronger weaponry in the defense sector; deterioration of the economic growth rate and a lower standard of living in the economic sector; and stronger elite cohesion and control of residents in the political and societal sectors. Externally, North Korea’s relationships with South Korea, the United States, and Japan deteriorated, and its relationships with the Soviet Union and China strengthened but there were also conflicts among socialist allies caused by North Korea’s continuous provocations.
The “parallel policy of military-first politics in economic-military defense” created a search for an advanced military strategy and a strengthening of weaponry by developing weapons of mass destruction in the defense sector, maintenance of an economic upturn and improved standards of living in the economic sector, weaker elite cohesion, and the maintenance of control of residents in the political and societal sectors. Externally, North Korea’s relationship to South Korea improved, but its relationships with the United States and Japan were improved and deteriorated, and its relationships with Russia and China evidenced strengthening.
The “military-first economic policy” caused a wide-ranging use of military strategy and strengthening of weaponry through development of weapons of mass destruction, such as missiles and nuclear weapons, in the defense sector. Deterioration of economic growth and lower standards of living emerged in the economic sector, and stronger elite cohesion with weaker control of residents were in the political and societal sectors. Externally, North Korea’s relationships with South Korea, the United States, and Japan deteriorated, and its relationships to Russia and China were generally stronger but there were also conflicts among Russia, China and North Korea because of North Korea’s continuous missile launches and nuclear tests.
Among the three parallel policies, the positive internal and external outcomes were relatively more extensive for the “parallel policy of military-first politics in economic-military defense” because of its relatively greater assurance of security through negotiations with neighbor countries and the economic benefits obtained through economic cooperation with them.
Furthermore, each parallel policy’s unique characteristics induced particular effects on overcoming regime crises.
The “parallel policy of economic-military defense” increased the security threats from South Korea, the United States, and Japan; however, the effects of overcoming security crises were generally increased because security cooperation with the Soviet Union and China became stronger and a large-scale build-up of military armaments was undertaken. In addition, although economic deterioration was unavoidable because of excessive investment in the national defense, the effects of overcoming economic crises were somewhat greater because the external economic environment and economic cooperation were strengthened through the improved relationships with other socialist countries that had been deteriorating.
The “parallel policy of military-first politics in economic-military defense” decreased the security threat from South Korea, but it decreased and increased the security threats from the United States and Japan. The effects of overcoming security crises were generally increased because security cooperation with Russia and China was strengthened and a build-up of military armaments ensued. In addition, the North Korean economy maintained its upward trend due to improvements in the external economic environment and stronger economic cooperation with neighbor countries. The effects on overcoming economic crises also generally increased.
The “military-first economic policy” strengthened security cooperation with Russia and China and enabled a build-up of military power, such as a sharp increase in missile and nuclear power. However, Russia and China opposed North Korea's development of weapons of mass destruction, and, because security threats from South Korea, the United States, and Japan increased, overcoming security threats through the “military-first economic policy” only partially increased. In addition, the effects of overcoming economic crises generally decreased because North Korea’s economic power weakened with the deterioration of its external economic environment and economic cooperation, which degraded because of its missile launches and nuclear tests that were opposed by the international community.
In sum, among the three parallel policies, the effects of overcoming regime crises were strongest for the “parallel policy of military-first politics in economic-military defense.” This difference is because of the relatively stronger effects of “parallel policy of military-first politics in economic-military defense” on overcoming regime crises compared to the other two types of parallel policies by its assurance of security through negotiations with neighbor countries and the economic benefits obtained through economic cooperation with them.
In conclusion, among the three types of parallel policies during the Kim Il-Sung and Kim Jong-Il eras, the “parallel policy of military-first politics in economic-military defense” had relatively stronger positive internal and external effects and more of an effect on overcoming regime crises than the “parallel policy of economy-military defense” or the “military-first economic policy.”
목차
제1장 서론 1
제1절 연구목적 1
제2절 선행연구 검토 4
제3절 연구방법 10
1. 분석범위와 접근방법 10
2. 분석틀 14
제4절 논문의 구성 23
제2장 체제위기 발생과 병진노선 채택 25
제1절 ‘경제·국방 병진노선’(1962∼1970) 25
1. 안보·경제위기 발생 25
2. ‘경제·국방 병진노선’ 채택 29
제2절 ‘선군정치의 경제·국방 병진노선’(1999∼2002) 30
1. 안보·경제위기 심화 30
2. ‘선군정치의 경제·국방 병진노선’ 채택 35
제3절 ‘선군경제노선’(2003∼2011) 37
1. 안보·경제위기 심화 지속 37
2. ‘선군경제노선’ 채택 39
제4절 병진노선의 유형과 성격 비교 41
제3장 병진노선 추진의 대내외적 파생효과 53
제1절 ‘경제·국방 병진노선’(1962∼1970) 53
1. 국방력 강화와 전사회적 결집 53
2. 라이벌·적대국관계 악화 및 우방국관계 복원 76
제2절 ‘선군정치의 경제·국방 병진노선’(1999∼2002) 99
1. 국방력 강화와 경제회복세 유지 99
2. 라이벌·적대국관계 개선 및 우방국관계 정상화 115
제3절 ‘선군경제노선’(2003∼2011) 136
1. 국방력 강화와 경제 저발전 및 주민통제력 약화 136
2. 라이벌·적대국관계 악화 및 우방국관계 갈등·협력 교차 155
제4절 소결: 병진노선의 유형별 대내외적 파생효과 비교 183
제4장 병진노선 추진의 체제위기 극복효과 190
제1절 ‘경제·국방 병진노선’(1962∼1970) 190
1. 안보위기 극복효과 전반적 상승 190
2. 경제위기 극복효과 부분적 상승 193
제2절 ‘선군정치의 경제·국방 병진노선’(1999∼2002) 195
1. 안보위기 극복효과 전반적 상승 195
2. 경제위기 극복효과 전반적 상승 198
제3절 ‘선군경제노선’(2003∼2011) 199
1. 안보위기 극복효과 부분적 상승 199
2. 경제위기 극복효과 전반적 하락 201
제4절 소결: 병진노선의 유형별 체제위기 극복효과 비교 205
제5장 결론 212
제1절 요약과 함의 212
제2절 김정은시대 ‘경제·핵무력 병진노선’과 체제위기 극복효과 전망 219
참 고 문 헌 225