Many have argued that the Sino-North Korean relationship deteriorated due to the latter’s defiant act of not giving face to the former by conducting a series of nuclear tests and China’s continuous embrace of successive UN resolutions against the North, not to mention China adopting its own sanctions measures. However, this article argues that the rift already had begun when the negotiations on Rason, Hwanggumphyong, and Wihwa Islands broke down in August 2012. The reasons for the breakdown are still speculative at best, though presumably China’s depletion of patience against North Korea’s lackluster attitude at the negotiations was a factor. This article analyzes how it came to an end. It is significant and well worth study in the following meaningful ways. First, it explains the flexibility that gave China to not only adopt UN resolutions against North Korea but also its own individual sanctions in 2013. Second, it also allows us to see clearly how China’s distrust of North Korea began to take place. China’s distrust of the North was cemented by the incident and perhaps permeated into the perception of China’s fifth generation. Third, the end of the negotiations deprived China’s new leaders a chance to engage with its counterpart. The past records refute the absence of engagement at the summit, i.e., Kim’s seven summits with his Chinese counterparts from 2000 to 2011. However, China’s distrust of North Korea was enhanced by its sense of deception that Pyongyang was not interested in economic liberalization but only money. Against this background, the article will address how the high hopes that Beijing had for Pyongyang plummeted to distrust and disrespect, driving a wedge between the two to the point of no return

Ⅰ. Introduction

Ⅱ. China's huge hopes for North Korea's Willingness to Open up

Ⅲ. China's Loss of Trust and Faith in North Korea

Ⅳ. Conclusion