What factors determine the success of, and failure thereof, Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) and Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) respectively? What are the factors and conditions that enhance the effectiveness of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) nonproliferation regimes? Does correlation exist between the effectiveness of regimes and the great power' support for said regimes? If so, under what circumstances or determinants does the great power support or reject regimes? This study is to identify the determinants of the success and failure of nonproliferation regime of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) under the U.N. system. The international efforts to ensure the life and safety of mankind from WMD have led to create 19 WMD nonproliferation regime starting with the Geneva Protocol in 1925. Among 19 WMD nonproliferation regimes, only 4 regimes (CWC, INF, NPT, IAEA) have strong implementation power and are evaluated as successful regimes, while 5 regimes (PTBT, Tlatelolco, CTBTO, IND NNT, Pelindaba) have not been ratified by states parties and thus have not gone into effect. Case studies of successful regimes and failed regimes reveal the factors that enhance the regime's ability to implement, and explain the phenomenon of support or rejection by the great power selectively intervening in the factors that strengthen the implementation. This study reveals the factors that determine support or rejection of the regime for the nonproliferation of WMD by the great power, which can be used as a very useful tool for evaluating the regime’s effectiveness and predicting the future of regimes. Through comparing successful cases of the CWC with failures of the BWC, the thesis asserts that four determinants influence the great power's decision to support or reject regimes: ‘non-restraint,’ economic interests, the technology gap and bargaining. Regardless of the counterparts' aims and the type of weapon, the great power provides full support to strengthen a regime effectiveness when faced with a regime i) aiming to never constrain states’ freedom of behaviors, ii) enhancing economic interests, iii) demonstrating a relatively narrow the technology gap between the great power and regional powers exist, and iv) bargaining with regional powers to garner support. The implication of this study can be applied to the BWC which remains weak in status responding North Korea’s biological threats on Korean peninsula. Moreover, considering the fact that future pandemic may not be naturally occurring diseases, but artificial biological terrorism and deliberate attacks, measures to strengthen the implementation of the Biological Weapons Convention must be urgently needed to respond to large-scale biological incidents including the next pandemic that require transnational responses in the future.

Abstract

I. Introduction

II. Theoretical Debates on Regime Effectiveness

III. Success of WMD Regime: CWC
1. Determinants of the great power’s commitment on the CWC
1) Nonrestraint
2) Economic Interests
3) The Bargaining
4) Technology Gap

IV. Failure of WMD Regime: BWC
1. Determinants for Great Power’s Commitment to the BWC
1) Nonrestraint
2) Economic Interest and Technology Gap
3) The Bargaining

V. Comparative Analysis

VI. Implication on Korean Peninsula

VII. Conclusion

Bibliography

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