[학술논문] The North Korean Nuclear Program: From a Conditional Bargaining Chip to the Ultima Ratio in Deterrence
...the 1990s, Pyongyang was now viewing its nuclear weapons program as the tool to achieve actual, nuclear deterrence. At the end of the 1990s, North Korea had recast it from a tool for a grand diplomatic bargain to a military-political instrument. Since then, North Korea has been fairly consistently working on strengthening its position as a de facto nuclear power. On the basis of this analysis, I argue...
[학술논문] 북한의 핵 미사일 위협에 대한 일본의 군사 외교적 대응
...response to nuclear-armed North Korea, Japan has taken extensive non-nuclear military measures in order to cope with the North Korean threat while being less active in using diplomacy. Analysts estimate that North Korea had possessed 33 to 55 kilograms of plutonium enough for 6 to 13 nuclear devices. Two nuclear tests in 2006 and 2009 proved that North Korea had successfully produced nuclear devices....
[학술논문] The Trust-building Process on the Korean Peninsula and Directions to Resolve North Korea’s Nuclear Issues
... North to come to negotiations for dismantling its nuclear program, facilities, materials, and weapons in a complete, verifiable, and irreversible way, South Korea needs to adopt a two-track strategy toward North Korea with a strategy of deterrence and pressure on the one side and diplomacy on the other. In the consultation process, South Korea needs to develop a grand package deal by combining economic...
[학술논문] The Park Geun-hye Government’s Role in a Needed New Strategy toward North Korea
...South Korea must take the leading role in developing new issues in its diplomacy toward Pyongyang. President Park could propose multiple negotiations over at least six South-North issues that could yield outcomes favorable to South Korea. The paper also suggests ways for the Park Government to coordinate with the United States over strengthening deterrence against a North Korea with nuclear warheads.
[학술논문] Game Changer: North Korea under the Obama-Lee Partnership and Beyond
...of capability. The author argues that credible intimidation lies at the core of “Proactive Deterrence.” Case studies in this paper also show that inconsistency in policy toward North Korea should be considered an important factor in the failure to coerce North Korea to abandon its nuclear program. Factors of domestic politics and ideological confrontation in South Korean society are also...