The complete denuclearization of North Korea is mainly a diplomatic task, but at the same time geo-strategic and technical one, which calls for an interdisciplinary approach. By exploring the technical signatures of the uranium enrichment program, this article argues that diplomatic solutions alone may not deliver the goal of “final, fully-verified denuclearization.” The proliferation-prone and detection-resistant nature of centrifuge technology allowed Pyongyang secretly to build and operate modern enrichment facilities despite Washington’s supply-side efforts to combat proliferation. Also, the failure of the 1976 Symington Amendment, invoked to dissuade Islamabad from acquiring uranium bombs, attests to the fact that a demand-side approach may not work either against a fragile regime determined to “east grass” in order to be a nuclear power. Unless the technical challenges are adequately addressed, North Korea’s clandestine enrichment program, coupled with deep distrust, will complicate and even derail the whole process of denuclearization from negotiations to verifications.