본 논문은 북한에서 산림 탄소 거래를 실행하기 위한 세계은행이나 다국적 기업과 협상의 기차자료로 산림 주변지역 주민의 정보고지 동의를 확보한 계약형 탄소권을 설정한다는 연구결과이다.
기후변화에 대처하기 위한 국제 기금의 총액은 계속 증가하고 있으며, 2015년 파리협정으로 연간 1,000억 달러 규모의 기금 목표를 설정하여 국제 원조 재원을 확보하게 되었다.
아울러 개발도상국들의 탄소저장 프로젝트를 지원하기 위해 UN-REDD, 세계은행의 FCPF와 같은 다양한 다자간 국제기구가 창설되었다. 이에 따라 북한을 포함한 많은 나라들은 산림 탄소시장에 참여하기 위한 자금 지원 제안서를 제출하였다. 그러나 북한의 경제는 주체사상에 근거한 국가통제 경제체제로 인해 침체되었고, 북한 주민은 극도의 빈곤상태에 빠져 산림에서 땔감 채취와 다락밭 경작과 같은 무차별적 벌목을 하고 있으나 북한 정부기관은 이를 규제하지 못하여 삼림파괴가 지속되고 있다.
산림전용 및 황폐화 방지(REDD+)사업은 탄소 배출을 줄이기 위한 수단으로 산림을 유지하거나 복원한 지역사회에 금전적 보상을 해주는 제도이다. 산림탄소권은 산림탄소의 소유자가 보상을 받는 권리와 산림지역 주민이 산림탄소거래에 대한 정보를 제공받고 스스로 의사결정을 수행하는 절차적 권리(Free Prior Informed Consent: FPIC)로 나눌 수 있다.
세계은행은 기금총액, 수행하는 프로젝트의 규모, 물리적∙인적 자원의 측면에서 개발도상국의 탄소배출권 시장에서 가장 영향력 있는 다자개발기구이다. 세계은행은 자금 지원을 통해 북한 산림 지역 주민의 FPIC 권리를 보호할 수 있는 효율적인 도구가 될 수 있기 때문에 산림 탄소 프로젝트의 초기단계에는 세계은행의 도움이 필요하다. 북한에 투자한 재원의 수익성이 보장되지 않는 상태에서 다국적기업의 투자를 기대하는 것은 어렵기 때문에, 세계은행이 탄소배출 저감활동의 국가간 거래(Internationally Transferred Mitigation Outcome: ITMO) 대상 국가로 북한 투자를 결정하는 것이 필수적이다. 파리 기후 협상에서 중요한 쟁점은 국가들이 감축 목표 달성실적에 대한 국가보고에서 정보의 투명성이었다. 북한은 파리협정의 회원국으로서 감축 목표 달성을 위해 국가결정기여(Nationally Determined Contributions: NDC)를 정기적으로 제출해야 하는데, 산림자원을 비롯한 다양한 분야에서 정보 투명성이 요구된다. 개성공단과 금강산 관광 지구는 남∙북한간의 정치적 민감성으로 인해 정보 투명성에 대한 논의 자체가 어려웠다. 세계은행은 기금지원결정과정에서 토지 행정시스템 평가도구(Land Governance Assessment Framework: LGAF)를 활용하여 지원대상국의 법률시행현황을 평가하고 있다. 본 논문은 LGAF를 활용하여 북한에서 산림 주변 지역주민을 지원하기 위해 개선이 필요한 법적 조치사항을 제시하고 있다.
본 논문은 다국적기업이 주도하는 FPIC를 북한의 주민 감시 시스템(5호 담당제 및 생활총화)에 이식하여 지역 주민이 산림탄소거래에 대한 의사결정을 주도하는 개선책을 제시하고 있다. 다국적 기업이 안내하는 FPIC를 통해 국제적 소통의 증가는 북한 주민들이 다른 나라의 탄소 시장과 연계된 시장 경제 체제를 깨닫게 할 수 있다. 북한의 토지는 모두 국가 소유이며 북한 정부는 사유재산권을 인정하지 않는다. 하지만 인공위성 기술을 통해 산림 프로젝트 대상 지역의 탄소 재고량을 확인하여 탄소권의 소유자에 대한 보상의 기초자료를 확보할 수 있다. 산림주변 지역 주민들의 탄소권에 대한 보상이 제대로 이루어지지 않으면 가난에 시달리고 있는 북한 주민들이 탄소보존에 힘쓰기는 어려울 것이다. 북한은 주민이 거주하는 주소에 대한 등록제를 시행하고 있는 국가여서 북한 주민들은 거주 이동의 자유가 없다. 따라서 특별한 사유가 없다면 산림 지역 주민들은 평생 국가가 분배한 땅을 사용한다. 북한의 주민등록증인 공민증은 거주지역의 항구성과 토지 및 산림 관리 의무지역을 명시하고 있기 때문에 이는 토지사용권(land tenure)에 대한 근거자료로 활용될 수 있다.
오늘날 많은 다국적기업의 연간 수입은 북한 정부의 연간 예산을 능가한다. 세계은행은 북한과 같은 고립된 국가에 진출할 때 첫 번째 계약을 다국적 기업들과 체결하는 시스템을 갖추고 있어 이러한 국가들이 세계시장경제에 편입되는 것을 지원한다. 세계은행이 다국적기업에 자금을 지원하면서 북한이 고립된 경제 사고에서 벗어나게 할 수 있도록 하는 역할을 부여한다면, 다국적기업들은 북한에서의 탄소 거래의 FPIC 절차이행과 탄소거래이익을 공정 배분하는 역할을 수행하는데 중요한 도구가 될 수 있다. 다국적 기업과 북한 주민공동체 간의 측정, 보고 및 검증(Measuring, Reporting, Verification: MRV) 계약은 산림 탄소 배출권이 시장에서 판매될 수 있는 시스템을 제공할 수 있을 것이다. 인공위성 기술은 산림 분포 지역의 식별, 산림훼손 추세를 상당히 미시적인 수준으로 측정할 수 있을 만큼 발전하였고, 이 위성 정보는 북한의 MRV 계약 준수를 평가하는 근거자료로 사용될 수 있다. 공산당의 대리인인 현지 산림회사들이 제시하는 MRV 계약서는 북한 주민들의 신뢰를 이끌기 어려울 것이고 계약시행의 투명성 역시 담보되기 어려울 것이다. 북한 주민이 이미 장마당 등을 통해 익숙한 다양한 국적의 조선족(ethnic Korean)이 다국적기업이 고용되어 탄소시장과 저장과정, 탄소권 보상 등 계약이행 과정 전체를 담당하면 계약이행의 투명성을 확보할 수 있을 것으로 판단된다.
MRV 계약은 계약당사자간에 개별적으로 권리와 의무를 형성하는 계약이기 때문에 기존의 사회주의헌법이나 북한 국내법의 개정이 필요하지 않다. 먼저 특별경제구역(Special Economic Zone: SEZ)에 탄소거래제도가 도입되어 성공적으로 시행된다면 북한은 탄소거래에 대한 범국가적인 법률제정의 필요성을 느낄 것이다. 정보고지 동의를 확보한 계약상 탄소권은 지역 산림 공동체들과 협력하여 산림 탄소 재고를 유지할 수 있는 획기적인 방안이기 때문에 북한에서 기존 사회주의 법률시스템을 건드리지 않고 현실적으로 적용 가능한 접근법이 될 수 있다. 탄소권 보유자는 FPIC에 근거하여 법적 조치를 요구할 수 있기 때문에 장기적으로 북한의 탄소 거래를 활성화시키는 토대로 활용될 수 있다. 당사자간 계약에 의한 탄소권의 개념에 따라 파리 협정이 규정하는 법집행의 투명성이 북한 사회 전반에 확산될 경우 산림탄소거래가 북한 전체지역에서 시행될 수 있는 단초를 마련할 수 있을 것이다.

This thesis introduces contractual carbon right by informed consent that has been specifically configured for DPRK forest communities as a springboard to prepare for dialogue with multilateral donors and multi-national corporations (MNCs) regarding forestry carbon trading. Forestry carbon right as a part of human right is a recent development promoting information transparency in the global climate negotiation. No attempt has yet been made to systematically investigate how much such carbon trading invokes enforcement of information transparency as extra-legal behavior toward market economy. Funding for climate change has grown rapidly over the past few years and become one of the major flows of international aid. The 2015 Paris Agreement set up a new collective quantified goal from a floor of 100 billion US dollars per year, taking into account the needs and priorities of developing countries. Various multilateral programs such as the Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Degradation (UN-REDD), World Bank Forest Carbon Partnership Facility (FCPF) was created to help developing countries prepare to capture carbon in this exchange. Thus many countries including North Korea have submitted funding proposals to participate in the forest carbon markets.
In DPRK, the strong state-controlled economic system under Juche ideology has brought about stagnation in the North Korean economy and left its people in extreme poverty. Forested areas of DPRK are experiencing high levels of deforestation as local and state institutions have been unable to prevent slope cultivation expansion and fuel wood cutting. Carbon trading is a mechanism to reward actors for keeping or restoring forests as a means to reduce carbon emissions. Forestry carbon trading could become a valuable momentum toward reducing deforestation and degradation in DPRK by its monetary payment for carbon credits to local communities. Carbon right can be divided into two groups (compensated carbon right versus procedural carbon right): the right to fair compensation for carbon credit owner and the procedural right to participate in decision making that affect local communities. The right to fair compensation is a right to receive revenue earned from carbon trading. The principle of Free, Prior, and Informed Consent (FPIC) is to protect the legal procedural right for local forest communities to give or withhold consent to actions affecting their traditional lands and forest resources.
At the beginning, the research explores the role of the World Bank in ensuring FPIC transparency in DPRK. The Bank, in terms of the number of projects financed and the amount of resources available is the most important and influential multilateral development institution in the world. The Bank could become an ideal mean of enforcing FPIC rights in DPRK through its financing and advisory activities. The initial step of integrating FPIC rights into the forestry carbon trading must come from the Bank that regulates developing countries such as DPRK and MNCs by financial power. MNCs will be reluctant to get involved in forestry carbon trading with DPRK unless the Bank invests into DPRK as target country of internationally transferred mitigation outcomes (ITMOs) in the Post-2020 new climate regime.
A central issue in the Paris climate talks was strengthening “transparency” requirements to for the low carbon commitments in nationally determined contributions (NDCs). DPRK as a member to the agreement, needs to submit biennial reports describing the steps they’re taking to meet their emission goals. It is not a simple task, since information transparency is required for various sectors including forest resources in DPRK. Simply passing laws do not ensure the achievement of the desired information transparency. Investment in the Kaesong Industrial Zone and Kumgang mountain tourist zone already have been unproductive vehicles to induce information transparency policy since one-party dictatorship is forced to equip the people with Juche ideology over society and DPRK local peoples would have no bargaining power in free market system. In this regard, this thesis evaluates whether the Land Governance Assessment Framework (LGAF) proposed by the Bank can be used as a guide for international donors to identify the carrot and stick in supporting DPRK forest communities for carbon trading.
This thesis suggests that embedding MNC-guided FPIC into DPRK Resident Surveillance System (the subgroup management system, five-family system and the existing farmers union) can give opportunities for local forest communities to participate in the decision-making process. MNC-guide FPIC approach can establish a more credible signal for DPRK government for carbon trading and ultimately improve local specific efficiency of the FPIC mechanism. International communications increased by MNC-guide voluntary approach will allow local community’s access a reservoir of information about forestry carbon trading, including its impact on other similarly situated communities throughout the world. MNC-guided voluntary FPIC approach breaks down the typical legal concept of FPIC, but it works as a prelude to true FPIC commitment in consideration of DPRK specific national circumstance.
In terms of carbon right to fair compensation, DPRK is dominated by state owned land, and does not formally recognize customary tenure which results as a weak system for ensuring local tenure. If compensation for communities’ carbon rights is not guaranteed, it becomes difficult for them to serve as a guarantor of carbon preservation. DPRK is one of the few countries in the world holding a people’s registration system. The DPRK citizens are not free to choose their residence and to move it. Typically local residents would be using lands allocated by the State for their entire life. People’s registration card is a major source of legal and bureaucratic evidence for fixed residence and stable land tenure, which necessarily shows the full occupancy of the individuals for the land. The thesis indicates that it could be used as an evidential document for the carbon credit owner in compliance with the requirements for land tenure recognition.
Many MNCs’ yearly revenues today surpass the yearly budget of the DPRK government. The Bank’s projects tend to offer the first contracts for MNCs to enter in previously- isolated countries like DPRK since it is the key to include the previously-isolated countries into larger market shares. The Bank’s funding to MNCs can serve as a means of introducing DPRK to the forestry carbon trading by steering the country away from isolated economic thinking. In this sense, MNCs can be influential in making a pathway towards FPIC enforcement and fair benefit sharing of carbon trading in DPRK. This research suggests contractually inculcating FPIC enforcement responsibility in the practice of MNCs could change DPRK information transparency significantly since the Bank authorizes the MNCs to compel responsible parties in DPRK to seek information transparency.
An effective measured, reported and verified (MRV) contract between MNCs and local forest communities should provide a mechanism in which forestry carbon stock is ready to be sold in the markets. The last part of the thesis efforts to develop MRV contract enforcing two groups of carbon right (compensated versus procedural). Satellite remote sensing technology presented area-wide visual evidences of forest condition in the Kumgang Mountain (such as the identification of forested area, degradation trends for forest space). The satellite information could help start a discussion on establishing minimum information standards, which can be used to induce North Korea’s compliance with the MRV contract. Lack of trust for MRV contracts by local forestry companies on behalf of communist party could result in unsatisfied contract enforcement transparency even if monetary benefits are positive from carbon trading. This thesis proposes an approach to achieve mutual trust between the MNC and local forest communities on MRV contract by utilizing ethnic Koreans. Ultimately utilizing ethnic Koreans hired by MNCs has a great incentive toward “permanence,” or the guarantee of MRV contract without the risk of carbon leakage fundamental to the viability of carbon trading.
The MRV contract does not replace or reform any existing state legislation or constitutional law, because the carbon right by informed consent can be established within specific local communities outside the strict context of DPRK state-society. Once carbon trading is introduced in Special Economic Zones (SEZs), DPRK will not be able to ignore the need for comprehensive legal reform for carbon trading much longer. Such contract transparency approach would seem to simplify the legal arrangements necessary to secure the multilateral funding sources for the carbon trading. DPRK could diminish its State power within SEZ to comply with internal and external information transparency related to carbon trading. It will serve to advance DPRK well in terms of reaching a certain level in the carbon trading market, but it would be helpful to build its capacity and consistency required toward an open economy.
The conclusion of this thesis is that contractual carbon right by informed consent is a realistic and operational legal approach in DPRK to maintain the forest carbon stock in cooperation with local forest communities. The thesis output can be used as a valuable reference to initiate contractual carbon trading by informed consent in DPRK since instrumental framework for legal action is presented based on right to fair compensation for carbon credit owner and procedural right to participate in decision making (FPIC). Furthermore, advances for annual financing and transparency requirement in Paris agreement will open up a new potential for practicality of the contractual carbon right by informed consent beyond the previous researches mainly focused on explicit government legislation.

"Chapter 1. Introduction
1.1 Background to the research topic 1
1.2 Addressing solutions using World Bank LGAF 5
1.3 Aim of the study 8
1.4 Limitations and scope of the study 12
1.4.1 Potential of World Bank’s loans for a non-member country 12
1.4.2 Evaluating enforcement potential of UN security sanction against forestry carbon trading 13
1.4.3 World Bank’s loans supporting FPIC violations 17
1.4.4 MNCs as FPIC violating instrument 18
1.4.5 Scope of the study 20
1.5 Organization of thesis 2

Chapter 2. Conceptualizing suitable legal framework to receive multilateral incentive 23
2.1 Introduction 23
2.2 Evaluating trading potential of DPRK forestry carbon 30
2.2.1 Comparison between DPRK and Mongolia in forestry carbon stock 30
2.2.2 Financial aid supporting DPRK to implement the UNFCCC 35
2.3 International legislative instruments for forestry carbon trading 40
2.3.1 REDD in the Post-2020 new climate regime 40
2.3.2 Hierarchy of National Inventory Reporting in LULUCF 46
2.4 Relationship between compensated carbon right and FPIC 50
2.4.1 Procedural carbon right (FPIC) 52
2.4.2 Exploring carbon credit owner (tenure holder) 59
2.4.3 MRV for carbon stock 62
2.5 DPRK legal system for forestry carbon trading 66
2.5.1 Changing trends of DPRK legal system 66
2.5.2 Three separate legal frameworks 69
2.6 Contextualizing suitable legal framework to receive incentive 72
2.6.1 Relevance of LGAF in DPRK 72
2.6.2 DPRK realities on law enforcement and role of legal framework 74
2.7 Conclusion 78

Chapter 3. The role of the World Bank in ensuring FPIC transparency 8
3.1 Introduction 81
3.2 External and internal transparency 87
3.2.1 Structural problem for FPIC in DPRK 90
3.2.2 Internal transparency 92
3.2.3 External transparency 96
3.3 The role of the World Bank in enforcing FPIC carbon rights 99
3.3.1 DPRK State sovereignty and FPIC enforcement 99
3.3.2 Legal and judicial reform by World Bank 103
3.3.3 Carbon financing of World Bank 106
3.4 Potential and constraint of contract transparency within SEZ 109
3.4.1 DPRK’s funding proposal 109
3.4.2 Beginning pilot scale project in SEZ 114
3.4.3 The role of MNCs in ensuring contract transparency 119
3.5 Conclusion 123

Chapter 4. Embedding MNC-guided FPIC into DPRK Resident Surveillance System 126
4.1 Introduction 126
4.2 Essential background toward FPIC in DPRK 130
4.3 Existing legislation for information disclosure 135
4.4 Self-governing consent 145
4.5 Compromising FPIC in DPRK 157
4.5.1 Contractual FPIC right 157
4.5.2 MNCs commitment for information disclosure 159
4.6 Linking MNC-guided FPIC to the Resident Surveillance System 162
4.7 Conclusion 169

Chapter 5. Evaluating land tenure caused by fixed residence under DPRK societal control system 17
5.1 Introduction 17
5.2 The role of land tenure in maintaining baseline forestry carbon stock 175
5.3 Land ownership and land use-rights system in DPRK 182
5.4 Compensation for land use changes 196
5.5 Benefit sharing and tax 207
5.6 Conclusion 212

Chapter 6. Inculcating FPIC enforcement responsibility in MNCs through contracts 214
6.1 Introduction 214
6.2 Tailoring the World Bank Forest Carbon Partnership Facility to DPRK 217
6.3 Community based monitoring in establishing Forest Reference Level (FRL) 222
6.4 Establishing up-scaling partnership between MNCs and World Bank 229
6.4.1 Introducing MNCs involved in forestry carbon trading 230
6.4.2 Key players in the World Bank carbon project cycle 237
6.4.3 Establishing Forestry Carbon Trading Partnership in DPRK 243
6.5 Inculcating FPIC enforcement responsibility in MNCs through contracts 245
6.5.1 Debate on implementing human right norms to MNCs 246
6.5.2 Tailoring World Bank sanction regime 250
6.6 Conclusion 256

Chapter 7. Formulating MRV contract between MNCs and local forest communities 259
7.1 Introduction 259
7.2 The role of MRV contracts 262
7.2.1 Investigating available MRV technology 262
7.2.2 MRV information-gathering capability of satellite imagery 265
7.3 MRV to ensure sustainability of carbon pool 270
7.3.1 Operational clauses for carbon pool MRV 270
7.3.2 Operational clauses to secure sustainability of carbon pool 275
7.4 Utilizing ethnic Koreans to build mutual trust on MRV contract 28
7.5 Conclusion 288

Chapter 8. Conclusions 29
8.1 Introduction 29
8.2 Contributions of the research according to globally accepted practice 293
8.3 Key implications in enforcing rule of law in DPRK 299
8.4 Suggestions for future research 305"