North Korean leader Kim Jong Un declared the “Two Hostile States” doctrine during the 9th Plenary Session of the 8th Central Committee of the Workers’ Party of Korea (WPK) in December 2023, and the narrative was reiterated in his New Year’s policy speech at the Supreme People’s Assembly in January 2024. Since then, extensive discussions and analyses have emerged in Seoul and internationally. These analyses can largely be classified into two interpretations. One argues that the “Two Hostile States” doctrine reflects Kim Jong Un’s growing confidence bolstered by the advancement of North Korea’s nuclear capabilities and improved diplomatic relations, highlighted by the recent North Korea-Russia summit. Another interpretation suggests that the policy stems from North Korea’s defensive posture in the face of the worsening economic predicament and perceived failure in the regime’s competition with the South. Additionally, some analysts predict that this shift may face internal resistance in North Korea, as it marks a significant departure from the nationalistic discourse of the Kim Il Sung era. According to this perspective, it may be challenging for the Kim Jong Un regime to fully implement this policy shift without internal dissent. 
As nine months have passed after Pyongyang’s initial declaration of the “Two Hostile States” doctrine, this paper aims to revisit these perspectives by employing a more diachronic approach. In particular, it aims to examine the “Two Hostile States” doctrine’s position within North Korea’s broader political and ideological framework established by Kim Jong Un’s predecessors by drawing on key texts. It is worth noting that Kim Il Sung’s texts, including “With the Century,” addressed inter-Korean relations and the United Front strategy. Historically, Kim Il Sung’s texts were primarily employed during periods when North Korea faced external pressure or diplomatic isolation to justify its more defensive postures. However, once international pressures subsided, the Pyongyang regime shifted away from these discourses in favor of more offensive or independent policies. It has been empirically observed that this cyclical pattern has repeated itself over the decades. Recent years have seen the Kim regime use these historical texts primarily to justify its offensive foreign policy maneuvers, such as the advancement of its nuclear and missile capabilities. 
Viewed in this light, it would be meaningful to reinterpret the “Two Hostile States” doctrine based on the broader pattern of North Korea’s foreign policy shifts to infer the Kim Jong Un regime’s recent stance on the possibility of resuming nuclear talks and its approach to future negotiations. In addition, a critical reassessment is needed regarding the argument that the “Two Hostile States” doctrine faces significant resistance from the North Korean people because it contradicts the legacies of Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il. To accomplish this, this paper examines the main logic behind the pervasiveness and intensification of North Korea’s personality cult glorifying Kim Jong Un.