[학술논문] 북한정권 성립 이후 ‘통일’전략 논의와 전쟁 준비 - 1948년 9월부터 1950년 1월까지를 중심으로 -
...having a war in mind, while supporting the South Labor Party’s partisan activities. Throughout the year 1949, the North leadership was making efforts very secretly to strengthen the mobilization system of the people and also putting time and energy on raising the fund to increase armaments and reserve war materials. The North Korean leadership presumed that the people of North Korea would have aversion...
[학술논문] 북한 민족주의 역사학의 궤적과 환경
...‘people' and ‘class' through the reformulation of concept as accepting national values, parallelism with class category → expand of nationalism content by emphasizing the leadership of popular mass → ‘true nationalism' regarding universal Marx-Leninist content and patriotism as a medium. The North nationalist history currently naturalized as a Tangun (nation)-Kim...
[학술논문] Time to Balance Deterrence, Offense, and Defense? Rethinking South Korea’s Strategy against the North Korean Nuclear Threat
...offensive, and defensive capabilities, which are three general types of preparedness for ordinary nations. Seoul should specifically strengthen its capabilities to retaliate against the North Korean leadership. It should also develop a plan to neutralize North Korean nuclear weapons in case of either an imminent or actual North Korean nuclear offense. It is about time for South Korea to build missile defense...
[학술논문] From Jiang Zemin to Hu Jintao: The Evolution of China’s Policies toward the Korean Peninsula
... not disrupt policy continuity. Changes under the new leadership were incremental, and even though the Chinese government’s approach toward Korea has become increasingly active, Hu Jintao and his associates made little significant progress in the Six-Party Talks. Hu’s lackluster achievements reveal that China has not been able to play a defining role in addressing North Korea’s nuclear...
[학술논문] 해방직후 북한 보안국의 조직과 활동
...go through it. The Security Bureau tried to prevent pro-Japanese groups from entering the party, and attempted to expel anti-soviet and anti-communist activists through censorship. As a result, more than 40 percent of the Security Bureau workers was replaced. After the censorship, the security organizations became a military force trusted by the Soviet Army and the North Korean Worker's Party.