[학술논문] The Centrality of U.S.-DPRK Relations in Trilateral Cooperation: The Cases of KEDO and TCOG

...the United States, and Japan in addressing the North Korean nuclear issue, focusing on the centrality of U.S.-North Korea relations. The two cases of the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO) and the Trilateral Coordination and Oversight Group (TCOG) shows this power dynamics in the negotiation of the North Korea nuclear problem. The analysis demonstrates that the core of the trilateral...

[학위논문] 북한의 핵인식과 정책 변화 동인 연구: 6자회담 이탈 전후 시기를 중심으로

...perception. This perception subsequently determines North Korea’s nuclear outlook and policy orientation. The study identifies three distinct phases in the evolution of North Korea’s nuclear strategy. In the first phase(September 2005-August 2008), North Korea regarded its nuclear capability as a bargaining tool and adopted a negotiation-oriented strategy. Favorable external conditions-including the...

[학위논문] 김정은 정권의 핵정책 분석, 2011~2021 -북한 지배연합의 선택과 관계국의 대응을 중심으로

...that would undermine elite privileges. Maintaining the policies of his predecessors proved more effective in preserving elite loyalty. Rather than abandoning his predecessors’ nuclear ambitions, Kim chose to develop nuclear weapons and missiles previously unrealized, using them to reinforce his authority and legitimacy. This mutual interest between the ruler and the elite underpinned Kim’s hardline...

[학술논문] Persepsi Generasi Muda Indonesia Terhadap Permasalahan Di Semenanjung Korea

...Peninsular is a prime concern. Many students pointed out that main causes of conflict between two Koreas are ideological differences, nuclear bomb issue in North Korea, and societal antagonism between two Koreas. They also thought that the advancement of negotiation skills between two government officials is a key option to achieve reunification of Korean Peninsular, but, they thought, the sunshine...

[학술논문] Can—Should—Must We Negotiate with Evil?

...expand their nuclear and missile capabilities. President George W. Bush placed North Korea on an “axis of evil.” He loathed a leader who permitted more than a million of his subject to starve. But even if this repugnance was justified, did it serve U.S. and allied interests to end the dialogues that, in the Clinton years, offered hope of limiting and perhaps terminating the North’s nuclear weapons and...

[국내] 美北 핵협상시 비핵화-유엔제재 해제 연계방안

...resuming U.S-North Korea nuclear negotiations during Trump’s term can’t be ruled out, so it is time for preemptive preparation. It is expected how to link the denuclearization and the lifting of UN sanctions will emerge as one of the major issues in the US-North Korea negotiations. This article analyzed the UN sanctions lifting requirements and US-North Korea negotiation issues to seek a principle...

[국내] 한반도 비핵화 담론의 비교 검토: 정치적 과정으로서 비핵화

...“denuclearization” because they use the concept arbitrarily at each negotiation based on their internal dynamics. Third, the fact that the U.S.’s typical non-proliferation model of “report–disposal–verification,” which has been assumed as the model for the past 30 years, is too limited to capture the specificity of the North Korean nuclear issue, and the Korean Peninsula is another factor that causes the...

[국내] 바이든 행정부의 대북정책 전망과 시사점

...signs that some members of the Biden team are changing their approach to the North Korean nuclear issue. In the Biden era, South Korea's diplomatic role in Korean Peninsula issues is expected to expand. South Korea needs to build diplomatic and policy capabilities to expand its role in the multilateral negotiation environment, too. To this end, the government should urgently come up with measures to...

[국내] Extended Deterrent Effect of China and Its Implications on the U.S.-N. Korean Nuclear Negotiation

...its alliance credibility, China is unlikely to facilitate N. Korea to undergo complete denuclearization, even more clarifying N. Korea’s motivation to develop nuclear weapons and missile capabilities as a deterrent purpose for national security. Accordingly, the U.S. can find itself a primary determinant for the successful nuclear bargain with N. Korea, at least not in conclusive support of China.

[국내] Trump-Kim Bromance 2.0? The Differences between 2018 and 2025

...variable was added to this complexity with Trump’s return to the White House. To forecast Trump’s policy toward North Korea in his second term, it is essential to recognize these changes and consider the administration’s shifting policy priorities. Simply predicting a reemergence of the Trump-Kim “bromance” or revisiting the negotiation models of 2018–2019 would fail to account for the new realities.