[학술논문] Security Challenges and Policy Dilemmas of South Korea in 2012
...with the ROK-U.S. alliance and the relationship between South Korea and China. The best scenario would be if the G-2, i.e. the United States and China, are willing to assume their share of responsibilities and capabilities in pending issues facing the international community, but this could be wishful thinking. The importance of the ROK-U.S. alliance cannot be overemphasized as long as U.S.-China relations...
[학술논문] 한국 안보딜레마의 의미와 우리의 선택: 주요현안과 대주변국관계
...the peace initiatives toward South, mostly as a temporary expedient or as a disguise. No doubt, it is of paramount importance that our choice must guarantee the firmest foundation of the security of the Republic of Korea, at least, until the reunification of the two Koreas. In my view, South Korea needs to sustain the current bilateral military alliance with the U.S., while developing a multilateral...
[학술논문] Balance-of-Fear Theory and Korea-Japan-U.S. Relations, 1945-1953
...with balance-of-fear theory, explains the puzzling triangular dynamics of Korea-Japan-U.S. relations in the early Cold War period. Glenn Snyder’s concept of “alliance security dilemma” associated with abandonment/entrapment fears among allies, though useful, is not enough for explaining alliance/alignment politics among states. This article additionally employs two more fears: fear...
[학술논문] Alliance Theory and Northeast Asia: Challenges on the 60th Anniversary of the Korea-U.S. Alliance
...alliance with the United States in lieu of multilateralism or confidence-building measures among regional states. The problem, however, is that while the Korea-U.S. alliance has evolved into a relationship that encompasses economic, social and cultural cooperation in the post-Cold War period, South Korea’s core security interest—the improvement of inter-Korean relations and the realization of peace...
[학술논문] China’s Dilemma on the Korean Peninsula: Not an Alliance but a Security Dilemma
...source of China’s attitudes toward North Korea’s provocations for two reasons: The first is that China reckons the cost of entrapment would be greater than any gain—a constraint that has the opposite effect for North Korea. The other is structural, in that neither China nor North Korea can afford to abandon the alliance against the South Korea-U.S. and U.S.-Japan alliances. An abandonment...