[학술논문] Strategy Optimization of Peripheral Nuclear States: Hybrid Modality Deterrence in Confronting Regional and Extra-Regional Threats

...relies on centralized command and calibrated escalation, including the option of first-use, to compensate for conventional inferiority. The second, Limited Retaliatory Response, is employed against the United States, whereby Pyongyang leverages Guam as a strategic hostage in the absence of reliable mainland strike capability. Taken together, these postures constitute a flexible and adaptive deterrent framework...

[학술논문] 『세기와 더불어』에 서술된 북한 민족해방운동사 인식의 변화상과 함의

...history of North Korea’s national liberation movement on the view of national united front and reinterpretes nationalism. The reason is connected on change of policy toward South Korea. North Korea have nothing to do but carry out the policy on the defensive instead of last policy on the viewpoint of the ‘united front ’ because of attaining their goals of survival strategy of political system. With...

[학술논문] ROK–U.S.–Japan “Operational” Security Cooperation for Responding to a Two-Front Crisis

...simultaneous two-front crisis in these subregions would pose a grave threat to regional stability, as China and North Korea could coordinate to exploit vulnerabilities in the United States and allied postures—triggering a “strategic balloon effect” that undermines deterrence. However, the current framework for trilateral security cooperation among the Republic of Korea (ROK), the United States, and Japan...

[학술논문] 북한의 통일전선전술 비교(김일성·김정일·김정은 시대) 연구

본 연구의 목적은 북한 통일전선전술의 지속성과 변화를 평가하고 분단 이후 김일성·김정일·김정은 시기의 ‘공산주의 대남통일전선전술’의 공통점과 차이점을 분석하는 것이다. 북한의 ‘통일전선전술’의 본질을 정확히 파악하기 위해 ‘대남혁명 전략’ 의 개념과 기원 배경을 포함한 김일성 시대부터 김정일과 김정은 시대까지의 시기별 최고지도자가 추구해 온 ‘대남혁명전략’ 과 ‘통일전선 전술’의 전개양상을 각종 문헌과 실제 전개된 사례를 바탕으로 비교 하였다. 김일성·김정일·김정은 시대 통일전선전술의 지속성은 최고지도자의 절대권력 유지안정을 위한 체제결속이며, 각 지도자의 시대별 대남혁명 기조와 통일전선이론의 목표는 북한 내부의 혁명역량을 강화 시켰다. 특히, 김정은 시대에서는 지능화된 통일전선전술로서 사이버(Cyber)활동기반의

[학술논문] ‘분단극복사론’의 첫 성과 『조선민족혁명당과 통일전선』

...of issues. Therefore, Kang’s historical study, which identifies the history of the national movement as a part of the movement to establish a united nation state, can be regarded as having been embedded with a strong sense of contemporariness. The united front policy of the National Revolutionary Party of Korea was different from that adopted by those who implemented the reconstruction of the Communist...

[해외] Kim’s Dangerous Liaisons: Russia, China, and the Growing North Korea Threat

... select missiles, and manpower to Russia. In February 2025, Ukraine’s military intelligence chief publicly claimed that North Korea was providing about half the ammunition Russia was using at the front. Based on Ukrainian military intelligence estimates from November 2025, North Korea has supplied Russian forces with around 6.5 million artillery rounds since 2023 and with sophisticated long-range...

[해외] A Challenging but Essential Task: Security Cooperation Between South Korea and Japan

...experts from the United States, Japan and South Korea. In this context, South Korea and Japan should establish a formal framework for discussing the scope of logistical and operational support Japan could provide in the event of a crisis on the Korean Peninsula. Additionally, the United States, South Korea and Japan should collaboratively formulate a strategy to manage a potential two-front war scenario...

[해외] Post-Party Congress Elections

...15th Supreme People’s Assembly (SPA) on March 15, its first parliamentary elections in seven years and two years behind schedule. Following his replacement as director of Bureau 10, formerly the United Front Department (UFD), during the Party Congress, Ri Son Gwon took on leadership positions at one of the DPRK’s (Democratic People’s Republic of Korea or North Korea) satellite parties. Finally, one...

[해외] North Korea’s Nuclear-Cognitive Warfare Strategy

...rise to much speculation about the prospects of reengagement between the United States and North Korea. However, even if dialogue resumes between the two countries as Trump hopes, it is unlikely to lead to substantial progress on denuclearization. Instead, Kim Jong Un is more likely to try to secure a dominant position on the Korean Peninsula, with few concessions on the nuclear front in the process.

[해외] North Korea Leaving Maneuvering Room with the US While Preparing for Long-Term Confrontation

...capabilities. This was perhaps most vividly demonstrated by Kim Jong Un’s unprecedented visits to nuclear-material production facilities and the Nuclear Weapons Institute (NWI) in September 2024 and in January 2025. The nuclear signaling aligns with Pyongyang’s renunciation of its three-decade policy centered on normalizing bilateral diplomatic ties with the United States by working toward denuclearization.