[학술논문] Framing Multi-lateral Energy Security Framework in Northeast Asia?: Lessons from KEDO and ECT
...discuss KEDO nor to deal with North Korea’s nuclear proliferation issue, nor to focus on EU energy policy but to elaborate original idea and concept of both KEDO’s and EU’s limited achievements and to apply them to the potential building regional energy security framework in Northeast Asia. The article contends that both KEDO and ECT approaches toward energy security are equally...
[학술논문] Between Denuclearization and Nonproliferation: U.S. Foreign Policy toward North Korea during the Obama Administration
...generated a more serious threat and engaged in more frequent provocations than Iran. This study attempts to explain the Obama administration’s passive policy toward North Korea with reference to the constructivist perspective. The passive policy toward North Korea, strategic patience, is the result of the U.S. understanding that despite its advanced nuclear and missile technology, it is neither...
[학술논문] Strategies for Positive Engagement with North Korea
... that combines positive engagement with a genuine willingness to negotiate, with the ultimate goal of preventing nuclear proliferation and other potentially dangerous situations. In this context, the “Nunn-Lugar” concept may be a viable option, allowing supervising states to enact control measures that are very difficult to reverse.
[학술논문] North Korea’s Nuclear Decision-making and Plausible Scenarios
... the losses resulting from using nuclear weapons. In the meantime, the advancement and enlargement of the nuclear arsenal can help reduce the risks associated with using them. The Kim Jong Un regime, with its expanding nuclear program, is thus growing all the likelier to use nuclear weapons in possible future wars, and also to increase the number of nuclear weapons it would employ in such wars.
[학술논문] On the Non-Use and Abuse of Nuclear Proliferation Intelligence: The Cases of North Korea and Iran
...forced to respond in ways that would complicate their preferred policy agenda. This essay examines key instances of the non-use or abuse of proliferation intelligence on North Korea’s and Iran’s nuclear programs, when U.S. policymakers appeared to overrate their preferred policy response to North Korean and Iranian nuclear misbehavior, but also to be disinclined to further pursue intelligence...